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Curbing Energy Sprawl with Microgrids 
SARA C. BRONIN 
Energy sprawl—the phenomenon of ever-increasing consumption of land, particularly 
in rural areas, required to site energy generation facilities—is a real and growing problem.  
Over the next twenty years, at least sixty-seven million acres of land will have been 
developed for energy projects, destroying wildlife habitats and fragmenting landscapes.  
According to one influential report, even renewable energy projects—especially large-scale 
projects that require large-scale transmission and distribution infrastructure—contribute to 
energy sprawl.   
This Article does not aim to stop large-scale renewable energy projects or even argue 
that policymakers should focus solely on land use in determining whether energy projects 
are allowed to proceed.  Rather, it proposes that we advance the legal institutions 
necessary to facilitate one possible solution to energy sprawl: the alternative energy 
microgrid—that is, small-scale distributed generation between neighbors of energy derived 
from sources such as solar collectors, wind power systems, microturbines, geothermal 
wells, and fuel cells.  Microgrids are attractive from a public policy perspective.  They 
decentralize energy production, reducing the need for massive transmission lines and large 
centralized plants.  They allow property owners to achieve economies of scale by spreading 
the costs and the risk of installation and maintenance among many parties.  They provide 
cleaner alternatives to conventional energy methods of production.  And they improve 
system efficiencies by reducing the amount of energy lost during transmission across long 
distances to end users.   
Despite such benefits, regulatory, political, and economic barriers thwart microgrids.  
For example, state laws prohibit or severely limit their viability, while neighbors may 
object to living nearby.  This Article offers three proposals to address such barriers.  First, 
Congress should require states to consider a model standard for microgrids, just as it has 
required states to consider model standards in other areas of utility law.  Second, states 
should provide guidance to localities with respect to siting and permitting microgrid 
projects.  Third, states should develop and authorize legal institutions that would support 
microgrid projects, drawing from Professor Robert Ellickson’s proposal for block 
improvement districts, which accommodate the public-private nature of shared energy.  
Together, these proposals would support small-scale energy sharing collectives whose 
emergence could transform the American landscape. 
 
  
ARTICLE CONTENTS 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 549 
II.  ENERGY SPRAWL ............................................................................... 552 
A.  THE PHENOMENON ............................................................................. 553 
B.  THE DEBATE ....................................................................................... 556 
III.  MICROGRIDS ...................................................................................... 559 
A.  THE DEFINITION ................................................................................. 559 
B.  WHY MICROGRIDS? ............................................................................ 561 
IV.  THWARTING MICROGRIDS, FACILITATING  
SPRAWL .............................................................................................. 565 
A. REGULATORY BARRIERS ...................................................................... 566 
B.  POLITICAL BARRIERS .......................................................................... 568 
C.  ECONOMIC BARRIERS .......................................................................... 572 
V.  THWARTING SPRAWL, FACILITATING MICROGRIDS ............... 574 
A.  REGULATORY REFORM: “CONSIDERING”  
MODEL STANDARDS ....................................................................... 575 
B.  SITING REFORM: PROVIDING GUIDANCE TO LOCALITIES .................... 579 
C.  NEW LEGAL INSTITUTIONS .................................................................. 581 
VI.  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 584 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Curbing Energy Sprawl with Microgrids 
SARA C. BRONIN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Energy sprawl—the phenomenon of the ever-increasing consumption 
of land,1 particularly in rural areas, required to site energy generation 
facilities—is a real and growing problem.  Over the next ten years, 
significant investment in energy infrastructure will lead to widespread 
fragmentation and damage to natural ecosystems and wildlife and bird 
habitats.2  Ten years after that, at least sixty-seven million acres of land 
will have been developed for energy projects.3  By 2050, demand for 
electricity is expected to double, requiring the use of even more land.4  
Curbing energy sprawl exceeds the capabilities of local governments, and 
even states, as sprawl by definition presents complex cross-jurisdictional 
questions.   
With demand for energy showing no signs of abating, slowing energy 
sprawl will require a multi-faceted approach by all levels of government.  
One key component of this approach must be alternative energy 
microgrids—that is, small-scale, low-voltage distributed generation5 
                                                                                                                          
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Connecticut. 
1 This Article focuses on land, but energy infrastructure can extend to waters, too.  In 2009, the 
Obama administration announced a new policy opening federal waters for alternative energy projects 
with potentially profound negative impacts on the environment.  See President Barack Obama, 
Remarks by the President on Clean Energy (Apr. 22, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-in-Newton-IA/. 
2 Jessica B. Wilkinson & Robert Bendick, The Next Generation of Mitigation: Advancing 
Conservation Through Landscape-Level Mitigation Planning, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 
10,023, 10,023 (2010). 
3 Darci Palmquist, Energy Production and Nature: What Will the Impacts Be?, THE 
CONSERVATION BLOG OF THE NATURE CONSERVANCY (Aug. 26, 2009), http://blog.nature.org/ 
2009/08/new-energy-production-nature-impacts-energy-sprawl-renewable-rob-mcdonald/.   
4 LITOS STRATEGIC COMMC’N, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE SMART GRID: AN INTRODUCTION  
18 (2008) [hereinafter THE SMART GRID], available at http://www.oe.energy.gov/Documentsand 
Media/DOE_SG_Book_Single_Pages(1).pdf. 
5 The term “distributed generation” refers to the production of electricity by a small-scale source 
located at or very near the end users it serves.  See THE SMART GRID, supra note 4, at 12 (defining 
“[d]istributed generation” as “the use of small-scale power generation technologies located close to the 
load being served, capable of lowering costs, improving reliability, reducing emissions and expanding 
energy options”); MARK RAWSON, DISTRIBUTED GENERATION COSTS AND BENEFITS ISSUE PAPER 5 
(2004), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/papers/2004-08-30_RAWSON.PDF (stating that 
“[d]istributed [g]eneration is electricity production that is on-site or close to the load center and is 
interconnected to the distribution system”); U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., GLOSSARY, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/glossary/index.cfm?id=D#dist_generator (last visited Oct. 26, 2010) (defining 
“[d]istributed generator” as a “generator that is located close to the particular load that it is intended to 
serve”).  
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between neighbors for energy derived from sources such as solar 
collectors, wind power systems, microturbines, geothermal wells, and fuel 
cells, which have minimal negative impact on the environment.6  Our 
current legal regime, and state laws in particular, prohibit or severely limit 
such arrangements, thereby facilitating energy sprawl while thwarting 
investment in alternative energy resources.  As a result, only a handful of 
microgrid projects have been built across the country.7  Several of these 
projects have been publicly called microgrids but only serve one customer, 
so they fall outside of the definition of microgrids used by this Article.   
Consider, for example, a homeowner with a solar panel installation 
that produces more electricity than she uses.  Currently, if she can do 
anything at all with the excess electricity, she can only “sell” it back to 
local electric utility companies under state rules governing such 
transactions, known as net metering.8  This electricity will get redistributed 
                                                                                                                          
6 See ROBERT LASSETER ET AL., INTEGRATION OF DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES: THE 
CERTS MICROGRID CONCEPT 26 (2002), available at http://certs.lbl.gov/pdf/50829.pdf (defining the 
microgrid as “a semiautonomous grouping of generating sources and enduse sinks that are placed and 
operated for the benefit of its member customer(s)”); Thomas E. Hoff et al., Distributed Generation 
and Micro-Grids (USAEE/IAEE Conference, 1997), available at http://www.clean-
power.com/research/microgrids/MicroGrids.pdf (defining the microgrid as “an electrically isolated set 
of power generator that supply all of the demand of a group of customers”); F. Katiraei & M.R. Iravani, 
Transients of a Micro-Grid System with Multiple Distributed Energy Resources 1 (Int’l Conference on 
Power Sys. Transients, Paper No. IPST05-080, 2005), available at http://www.ipst.org/ 
TechPapers/2005/IPST05_Paper080.pdf (defining the microgrid as “a portion of a power system which 
includes one or more DG [distributed generation] units capable of operating either in parallel with or 
independent from a large utility grid, while providing continuous power to multiple loads and end-
users”); Douglas E. King, Electric Power Micro-grids: Opportunities and Challenges for an Emerging 
Distributed Energy Architecture 3 (May 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Carnegie Mellon 
University), [hereinafter King, Thesis] available at http://wpweb2.tepper.cmu.edu/ceic/pdfs_other/ 
Doug_King_PhD_Thesis_2006.pdf (defining the microgrid as “a small group of customers, 
interconnected at low voltages on a local power grid with a single point of interconnection with the area 
electric power system”). 
7 See Jesse Berst, Macro Trends Point to Microgrids, SMARTGRIDNEWS.COM (Nov. 28, 2006), 
http://www.smartgridnews.com/artman/publish/article_182.html (identifying a CERTS facility, a 
subsidiary of a Michigan-based utility offering to build microgrids for commercial and industrial 
customers, a prototype microgrid at a Vermont commercial/industrial park, two Wal-Mart microgrids, 
and a demonstration project at Sandia National Laboratories); Kerry A. Dolan, Thinking Small About 
the Grid, FORBES.COM (Mar. 10, 2009, 12:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/03/10/microgrid-
electricity-cleantech-technology-breakthroughs-microgrid.html (noting two Wal-Mart microgrids in 
Colorado and Texas, a demonstration microgrid installed by the Sacramento Municipal Utility District, 
and a microgrid backup power system at the Santa Rita Jail); Perfect Power at the Illinois Institute of 
Technology, GALVIN ELECTRICITY INITIATIVE, http://galvinpower.org/projects/perfect-power-illinois-
institute-technology (last visited Oct. 26, 2010) (describing the microgrid “that will not fail the end-
user” at the Illinois Institute of Technology); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Secretary Chu 
Announces More than $20.5 Million for Community Renewable Energy Deployment Projects (Jan. 21, 
2010), available at http://www1.eere.energy.gov/recovery/news_detail.html?news_id=15759 
(describing a microgrid project for the Forest County Potawatomi Tribe that includes a biogas digester, 
wind turbines, solar panels, a biomass combined heat and power facility, and a University of California 
at Davis project that includes biogas, a fuel cell, and a storage battery). 
8 Eight states have not allowed for net metering, prohibiting individuals from selling excess 
energy produced by their renewable energy technologies back to the local electric utility company.  
LAUREL VARNADO & MICHAEL SHEEHAN, NORTH CAROLINA SOLAR CENTER & INTERSTATE 
RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, CONNECTING TO THE GRID 11 (6th ed. 2009), available at 
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through the central transmission facility to other end users, becoming less 
efficient the farther it travels.  Under the laws of many states, the 
homeowner cannot enter into an agreement with her neighbor wherein the 
neighbor buys the excess power, lest she be considered to be a public 
utility9 and therefore be regulated more heavily than is warranted given the 
relatively small scale of her output.   
Consider also the situation in which a group of neighbors engages in a 
debate as to whether to install a wind turbine in a vacant lot that the city 
has given to them for redevelopment.  From the city’s perspective, a 
turbine would lessen the load on the local utility, which would reduce the 
number of unsightly and environmentally disruptive distribution lines 
cutting through town.  In many jurisdictions, these neighbors can divide 
the cost of installing the turbine but can neither centralize operational costs 
and pay for their later individual energy use nor connect the turbine to their 
individual parcels without violating public utility laws.  The likelihood that 
either the neighbors invest in the turbine, or that the homeowner invests in 
a solar panel whose output exceeds her basic needs, is slim.  The cost of 
alternative energy has decreased in recent years, but not enough to make 
recouping ongoing costs unnecessary for private parties.   
Although current state laws prohibit or severely limit alternative 
energy microgrids, such arrangements are attractive from a public policy 
perspective.  They decentralize energy production, reducing the need for 
nationwide transmission lines and large-scale centralized plants.  They 
allow property owners to achieve economies of scale by spreading the 
costs and the risk of renewable energy installation and maintenance among 
many parties.  They provide cleaner alternatives to conventional energy 
methods of production.  And they improve system efficiencies by reducing 
the amount of energy lost during transmission across long distances to end-
users.  If we agree that alternative energy microgrids are a good idea, then 
we must determine how to construct legal regimes that facilitate them.  In 
furtherance of that goal, this Article proceeds as follows.   
Part II sets the stage for the rest of the Article.  It begins by describing 
the phenomenon of energy sprawl, focusing on the role of the Nature 
Conservancy in framing the debate.  It then identifies several points of 
contention with the concept of energy sprawl, as identified by 
environmentalists, politicians, and other advocates.  It concludes by 
acknowledging that although the energy sprawl phenomenon may be 
difficult to accurately measure or predict, a problem exists.  A uniform 
approach to microgrids would be part of a multi-faceted solution.   
Part III articulates the alternative energy microgrid option.  It first 
                                                                                                                          
http://www.irecusa.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ConnectDocs/Connecting_to_the_Grid_Guide_6th_ 
edition-1.pdf (identifying the forty-two states that currently authorize net metering). 
9 Note that the term “utility” or “public utility” in this Article encompasses only electric utilities.   
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defines the microgrid and several related concepts.  It then analyzes how 
small-scale distributed generation advances national goals with respect to 
energy security, energy independence, and sustainable communities.   
Part IV identifies barriers to the microgrid in both state and local law, 
focusing on the lack of coordination between various levels of government.  
Inconsistent, unclear, and outright hostile laws prevent users from 
implementing microgrids.  Political considerations also serve as barriers—
most significantly the opposition of public utilities that control most of our 
existing energy infrastructure, and neighbors who work through local 
governments to halt microgrid projects.  Finally, economic factors, 
including subsidies of traditional energy infrastructure, work to promote 
energy sprawl, while thwarting the microgrid.   
After concluding that the key barriers to microgrids relate to 
regulation, siting, and institutional development—all areas controlled by 
states—Part V recommends three possible paths forward.  First, Congress 
should tackle energy sprawl by requiring states to consider model 
regulations for microgrids.  The consideration requirement has encouraged 
states to modify their laws to provide nationally recognized 
interconnection standards, and I believe upon review states would find 
microgrids to be compelling means to meet their own alternative energy 
use goals.  Second, states should provide guidance to localities with respect 
to siting and permitting microgrid projects.  This guidance can be issued 
without infringing on localities’ core autonomy in regulating land use.  
Third, states should authorize new legal institutions that would facilitate 
microgrid development.  More specifically, states should draw from the 
work of Professor Robert Ellickson with respect to block improvement 
districts, to authorize block-level energy districts that recognize the 
renewable energy produced as a shared public/private resource.   
Ultimately, this Article does not aim to halt alternative energy; nor 
does it advocate that policymakers focus solely on land use in determining 
whether energy projects should proceed.  Rather, it attempts to introduce 
one solution to curbing energy sprawl via small-scale distributed 
generation.   
II.  ENERGY SPRAWL 
Although the Nature Conservancy popularized the term “energy 
sprawl” in 2009, the phenomenon has an intuitive explanation.  Simply put, 
energy sprawl refers to the land required to produce and move energy, 
measured in acres per total quantity of energy production.  This Part 
defines energy sprawl, including jurisdictional issues that affect it.  It also 
 2010] CURBING ENERGY SPRAWL WITH MICROGRIDS 553 
assesses the recent debate over the Nature Conservancy’s report.10 
A.  The Phenomenon 
When Americans think of sprawl, they typically think of urban sprawl: 
the unplanned, and often unsightly, expansion of human development into 
previously undeveloped rural areas.  Urban sprawl, as its name suggests, 
develops in roughly concentric circles around cities.  In some cases, urban 
sprawl is contained within city limits.  In other cases, it crosses urban 
growth boundaries, into other counties, or even into unincorporated areas.  
When urban sprawl warrants government attention, interested jurisdictions 
often include a city and a county government or neighboring city 
governments.  At times, state legislatures weigh in to influence land use 
policies, but by and large regulating urban sprawl is a local government 
function. 
Like urban sprawl, energy sprawl involves expansion into undeveloped 
areas.  Energy sprawl, however, is linear, not concentric.  Traditional 
energy infrastructure, which takes the form of generating facilities and 
distribution centers connected by transmission lines, looks like a web in 
maps.11  Another difference from urban sprawl is that energy sprawl does 
not necessarily follow existing settlement patterns.  In fact, some of the 
largest energy generating facilities may be found in some of the most 
underpopulated places in the country.12  Builders of such facilities no doubt 
find it easier to locate in places far outside urban boundaries, where fewer 
people object and where natural resources like sunlight and wind are easier 
to capture.  In such areas, only counties or states, or the Bureau of Land 
Management if federal land is involved, have jurisdiction over siting.   
While extra-urban siting may be attractive for the problems it avoids, it 
has significant negative long-term impacts.  In 2009, the Nature 
Conservancy’s Energy Sprawl or Energy Efficiency report focused on one 
of these negative impacts: the reach, in purely spatial terms, of different 
methods of production.  The environmental nonprofit estimated that at 
least 206,000 square kilometers—an area larger than the state of 
Nebraska—will be impacted by energy development over the next twenty 
years if Americans do not substantially increase energy efficiency.13  It 
predicted that energy will shift from fossil fuels to methods that may 
                                                                                                                          
10 Robert I. McDonald et al., Energy Sprawl or Energy Efficiency: Climate Policy Impacts on 
Natural Habitat for the United States of America, 4 PLOS ONE 1, 1 (2009). 
11 See Visualizing the U.S. Electric Grid, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 1, 2009), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=110997398 (offering a comprehensive, 
interactive map showing energy infrastructure across the country). 
12 See Elizabeth Souder, World’s Largest Wind Farm Opens in West Texas, DALL. MORNING 
NEWS (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/bus/stories/DN-wind_01bus. 
State.Edition1.ddb4af.html. 
13  McDonald et al., supra note 10, at 1. 
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require greater amounts of land than fossil fuels require.14   
According to the calculations of the Nature Conservancy, among the 
least land-intensive methods of production are nuclear power, using about 
two square kilometers to produce a terawatt-hour annually and geothermal, 
using an average of seven and a half square kilometers to produce the same 
amount of energy.15  Biofuels and biomass, at around 350 and 550 square 
kilometers respectively, are among the most land-intensive.16  Somewhere 
in the middle are coal, at ten; solar thermal, at fifteen; natural gas, at 
nineteen; solar photovoltaic, at thirty-seven; petroleum at forty-five; 
hydropower at fifty-four; and wind at seventy-two square kilometers per 
annual terawatt-hour.17  The report estimates that the land use figures for 
geothermal, natural gas, and wind production can be divided into direct 
disturbance of land of about five percent and indirect disturbance, 
involving disruptions of larger ecosystems, habitats, and wildlife activity, 
for the remaining ninety-five percent.18   
To put this analysis in more concrete terms, take an example of one 
project using a somewhat land-intensive energy production method, wind 
farming.  The largest wind farm in the world opened in October 2009, 
occupying almost 100,000 acres (or 405 square kilometers) in sparsely 
populated West Texas.19  The farm has 627 turbines, with each turbine 
taking up, on average, about 160 acres.20  It generates 781.5 megawatts (or 
6.8 terawatt-hours, using a conversion of 114 megawatts per terawatt-hour) 
and powers 265,000 homes.21  For every megawatt generated, the farm 
uses about 128 acres of land (100,000 divided by 781.5 megawatts).  
Interestingly, this figure represents more than double the estimated acreage 
required to produce a megawatt—60 acres—by the American Wind 
Energy Association.22  Converted into the units of measurement used by 
                                                                                                                          
14 Id. at 6. 
15 Id. at 3. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 4.  Note that the figures in the text are rounded to the nearest integer.  It may also be 
important to note that the report does not appear to have included area used in transporting—via rail, 
pipelines, or similar means—the fossil fuels.  Id. at 8–9.   
18 Id. at 4 (“[P]roduction techniques that involve wells like geothermal, natural gas, and petroleum 
have about 5% of their impact area affected by direct clearing while 95% of their impact area is from 
fragmenting habitats and species avoidance behavior.  Wind turbines have a similar figure of about 3–
5% of their impact area affected by direct clearing while 95–97% of their impact area is from 
fragmenting habitats, species avoidance behavior, and issues of bird and bat mortality.”).  The 
American Wind Energy Association has confirmed that for every megawatt of power, sixty acres of 
land are needed, although only five percent of needed land area is occupied by the actual turbine.  
Resources, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, http://www.awea.org/faq/wwt_environment.html# 
What%20are%20wind%20powers%20other%20environmental%20impacts [hereinafter Resources] 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2010). 
19 Souder, supra note 12. 
20 Id.   
21 Id.     
22 See Resources, supra note 18.   
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the Nature Conservancy report, in order to produce one terawatt-hour of 
energy, the farm requires approximately 60 square kilometers of land (405 
square kilometers divided by 6.8 terawatt-hours).  Although the number of 
acres used by this particular wind farm, 60, is fewer than the 72 square 
kilometers estimated by the authors of the Nature Conservancy report, the 
report estimate seems reasonable, given this farm’s exceptional size.   
Taking this example further reveals how this wind farm contributes to 
energy sprawl.  To be sure, the turbines occupy a significant amount of 
land themselves.  Using the industry standard estimate that five percent of 
the land in a wind farm is actually used for equipment,23 5,000 acres of 
land of the Texas wind farm is likely directly occupied and thus disturbed 
by the generating equipment—in this case, turbines.  It is unclear whether 
this five percent estimate includes the blasting, bulldozing, and digging 
required to locate the deep concrete foundations needed to support the 
massive steel turbines, or if it includes the roads, substations, and other 
facilities that support the turbines.  Assuming that it does, the surface of 
the remaining 95,000 acres of the wind farm remains open.  This open land 
may suffer from indirect effects from the construction, operation, and 
maintenance of the turbines.  Such activities also alter delicate ecologies, 
underground and aboveground, as well as landscape vistas.24  Giving new 
meaning to the term “climate change,” studies have shown that wind farms 
hinder not only weather forecasting,25 but also the natural patterns of 
weather itself.26   
Birds and other wildlife may be as directly threatened as their habitat.  
In California, one wind farm killed so many birds—tens of thousands, 
including more than a thousand protected golden eagles—that citizens 
brought its owners to court.27  Responding to the alleged facts behind the 
                                                                                                                          
23 Id.    
24 See, e.g., Adam M. Dinnell & Adam J. Russ, The Legal Hurdles to Developing Wind Power as 
an Alternative Energy Source in the United States: Creative and Comparative Solutions, 27 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 535, 537 (2007) (stating that critics “view this supposed environmental savior as a 
man-made plague on local landscapes and communities, fragmenting habitats, and causing irreparable 
ecological damage”).   
25 See William Kates, Wind Farms Interfering with Weather Radar in N.Y., USA TODAY, Oct. 13, 
2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/weather/research/2009-10-13-wind-farms-weather-
radar_N.htm (“Wind farms in upstate New York are interfering with National Weather Service Doppler 
radars, making it more difficult to detect and assess approaching lake-effect snowstorms.”).   
26 See D.B. Barrie & D.B. Kirk-Davidoff, Weather Response to a Large Wind Turbine Array, 10 
ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY & PHYSICS 769, 774 (2010) (testing the effects of an extremely large wind 
farm and observing that “[a]tmospheric anomalies initially develop at the wind farm site due to a 
slowing of the obstructed wind” and “[t]he anomalies propagate downstream . . . quickly . . . 
[suggesting] that predictable influences on weather may be possible”).   
27 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 591–92 (Cal Ct. 
App. 2008).  The court ruled that wildlife and birds are protected by public trust principles, explaining, 
“whatever its historical derivation, it is clear that the public trust doctrine encompasses the protection 
of undomesticated birds and wildlife.”  Id. at 599.  The court declined to apply those principles to the 
conflict at hand because the plaintiffs had not followed proper protocol in getting the case to court.  Id. 
at 591, 607.   
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California case, the American Wind Energy Association stated that 
“[d]etailed studies, and monitoring following construction, at other wind 
development areas indicate that this is a site-specific issue that will not be 
a problem at most potential wind sites.”28  Even if birds and other wildlife 
are only minimally threatened by newer wind technologies, critics of wind 
energy believe that large-scale wind developments have a devastating 
effect on the immediate environment.   
Beyond the 100,000 acres, large transmission lines must be built to get 
power to the 265,000 homes to be served by the wind farm.  These lines 
take years to create, given the need to coordinate with private landowners, 
and are extremely expensive.  Moreover, power lost in transmission is 
roughly ten percent.29  Accordingly, energy sprawl costs space, money, and 
energy itself.   
Despite the many troubling effects of large, out-of-the-way 
developments, government continues to direct significant support to 
projects with many hundreds or thousands of end users.  The Department 
of Energy has completed studies showing that the United States could 
obtain as much as twenty percent of its electricity from alternative energy 
sources such as wind power alone by 2030, much of it to be produced in 
large-scale facilities.30  As the government pushes for greater use of 
alternative energy, demand by large-scale alternative energy producers for 
land also grows.  As one measure, the Bureau of Land Management has 
received four hundred applications for large solar and wind plants covering 
more than two million rural acres.31  The question now is not whether 
energy sprawl will occur, but to what extent it may be contained.   
B.  The Debate 
Reaction to the Nature Conservancy’s report has been mixed.  Some 
have questioned the methods of the report.  Others have attempted to use 
the report’s findings for political gain.  Still others have simply ignored it.   
Perhaps the most vehement criticism of the methodology of the report 
so far has come from Matthew Wasson, an ecologist and the director of 
programs for an environmental nonprofit called Appalachian Voices.  He 
criticized the report’s reliance on “reports, fact sheets and brochures” to 
estimate the number of acres per unit of energy for each method of 
                                                                                                                          
28 Resources, supra note 18.   
29 Anya Kamenetz, Why the Microgrid Could Be the Answer to Our Energy Crisis, 
FASTCOMPANY.COM (July 1, 2009), http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/137/beyond-the-
grid.html?page=0%2C0#self.   
30 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, 20% WIND ENERGY 
BY 2030 1–2 (2008), available at http://www.20percentwind.org/20percent_wind_energy_report_ 
revOct08.pdf (“A 20% Wind Scenario in 2030, while ambitious, could be feasible if the significant 
challenges identified in this report are overcome.”). 
31 Kamenetz, supra note 29. 
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production.32  Wasson also argued that focusing on acreage unacceptably 
minimized the environmental impact of coal mining, in particular.33  Coal 
mining often involves shearing off mountain tops, disrupting ecosystems, 
and polluting waterways, among other negative impacts not included in a 
direct land disturbance, or acreage, measure.34  Finally, in Wasson’s 
analysis, the term “energy sprawl” armed those who oppose alternative 
energy with a catchphrase to frame their opposition.  He suggested that 
environmentalists “strike that buzzword from their lexicons and literature 
entirely.”35  
Unfortunately for Wasson, at least one politician quickly took up the 
energy sprawl mantle to make a political point.  A month after the Nature 
Conservancy report was released, U.S. Senator Lamar Alexander wrote an 
opinion piece for the Wall Street Journal.36  Drawing from the report’s 
statistics regarding the land-intensivity of wind power generation, Senator 
Alexander criticized plans of the Obama administration to generate twenty 
percent of the nation’s electricity from wind, stating that doing so would 
require setting aside a land area the size of West Virginia and constructing 
nineteen thousand miles of high-voltage transmission lines.37  In the piece, 
Senator Alexander also argued that the country should look more seriously 
at nuclear energy, the kind of energy the report identified as being among 
the least land-intensive.38   
Similarly, advocates of nuclear energy in Iowa believe that the report 
supported their push for a second nuclear reactor in the state.39  Other 
residents of Iowa, the state with the second highest level of wind energy 
production,40 reportedly ignored or rejected the Nature Conservancy’s 
assessment.41  The Cedar Rapids-based Gazette interviewed the executive 
                                                                                                                          
32 Matt Wasson, Misleading “Energy Sprawl” Study Pollutes Climate Debate, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Oct. 1, 2009, 9:22 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/matt-wasson/misleading-energy-sprawl_b_ 
306051.html.  But see McDonald et al., supra note 10, at 6–7 (identifying the source of most data as the 
Energy Information Administration’s National Energy Modeling System, “a comprehensive 
econometric model of U.S. energy production, imports, and consumption”). 
33 Wasson, supra note 32. 
34 See, e.g., SIERRA CLUB, THE DIRTY TRUTH ABOUT COAL (June 2007), available at 
http://www.sierraclub.org/coal/downloads/coalreport.pdf. 
35 Id. 
36 Lamar Alexander, Energy “Sprawl” and the Green Economy, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2009, at 
A21.   
37 Id.   
38 Id. (“Before we find ourselves engulfed in energy sprawl, it’s imperative we take a closer look 
at nuclear power.”).   
39 See David DeWitte, Iowans Not Buying into “Energy Sprawl” Argument, GAZETTE ONLINE 
(Jan. 19, 2010), http://gazetteonline.com/local-news/2010/01/19/iowans-not-buying-into-‘energy-
sprawl’-argument (interviewing a nuclear energy advocate).   
40 AM. WIND ENERGY ASSOC., ANNUAL WIND INDUSTRY REPORT 8 (2008), available at 
http://www.awea.org/publications/reports/AWEA-Annual-Wind-Report-2009.pdf (identifying Iowa as 
having 1,560 megawatts of wind power capacity, behind Texas with 2,671 megawatts of capacity).   
41 See DeWitte, supra note 39 (observing that the Nature Conservatory’s report has drawn little 
attention in Iowa). 
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director of the Iowa Renewable Fuels Association, a group that supports 
biofuels.  He claimed that the report failed to take into account the fact that 
grains for biofuels were being grown as efficiently as ever because of 
better seed genetics and agricultural practices.42  In other words, the 
report’s focus on land utilized by energy production is deceptive: While 
the full environmental impact of activities like coal mining is not taken into 
account, the full impact of biofuel production, which can easily be 
measured by the number of farms growing crops, is taken into account.   
In light of these and other criticisms, the lead author of the report, 
Robert McDonald, has explained that the scope of his report was limited.  
On behalf of the Nature Conservancy, McDonald said he intended simply 
to ensure that land use issues were being considered—along with other 
measures such as energy security, cost effectiveness, job creation, energy 
independence, and economic issues—as legislation relating to alternative 
energy is drafted and implemented.43  He neither intended to provide an 
endorsement of nuclear energy nor a critique of renewable energy.44  
Rather, he intended to promote “Energy By Design”: avoiding 
development when possible, minimizing impacts if development is 
necessary, and compensating for unavoidable negative impacts.45  Unlike 
Senator Alexander, McDonald praised the Obama administration’s efforts 
to permit certain renewable energy projects after thorough environmental 
reviews, stating that such a process exemplified the kind of proper 
management the report hoped to support.46 
From my perspective, the importance of the Nature Conservancy 
report did not lie in its specific findings relative to each method of 
production, but rather in its identification of an intriguing measure of the 
impact of methods of energy production.  Intuitively, the findings make 
sense: Producing energy impacts land.  The lesson is not that alternative 
energy should be avoided, but that careful attention must be paid to its 
scale and siting.   
                                                                                                                          
42 Id. 
43 See Rob McDonald, Energy Sprawl and the Importance of Fact, THE CONSERVATION BLOG OF 
THE NATURE CONSERVANCY (Aug. 26, 2009), http://blog.nature.org/2009/08/energy-sprawl-ethanol-
rob-mcdonald/; Rob McDonald, The Lessons I’ve Learned from “Energy Sprawl,” THE 
CONSERVATION BLOG OF THE NATURE CONSERVANCY (Sept. 17, 2009), http://blog.nature.org/ 
2009/09/energy-sprawl-rob-mcdonald-nature-conservancy/ [hereinafter McDonald, Lessons I’ve 
Learned] (arguing that land-use impacts are just one of many factors to consider when crafting climate 
change legislation). 
44 See McDonald, Lessons I’ve Learned, supra note 43.  Nuclear energy requires large capital 
outlays and raises safety concerns, among other problems not captured by the concept of energy sprawl.   
45 Id. 
46 See id. (“U.S. Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar’s recent efforts to permit some renewable 
energy development in appropriate places after thorough environmental review . . . show that energy 
sprawl is a challenge that can be overcome through proper management.”).  
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III.  MICROGRIDS 
Some people believe that we must choose between large facilities that 
generate alternative energy but destroy the environment, or the status 
quo.47  If that were the case, the problem of energy sprawl would seem 
insurmountable.  A third option, however, exists: the alternative energy 
microgrid, which deploys distributed generation technologies on a small 
scale.  Although the concept of the microgrid has been used in engineering 
circles for a decade, it is relatively new in legal academia, so it warrants 
further explanation.48  After clarifying the concept, this Part explains why 
the microgrid—and alternative energy microgrids, in particular—can help 
reduce the spread of energy sprawl.   
A.  The Definition 
To understand the microgrid, one must first understand the concept of 
distributed generation.  Distributed generation, also known as on-site 
generation or distributed energy, refers to the production of electricity by a 
small-scale source located at or very near the end users it serves.49  Energy 
production thus occurs in distributed, or decentralized locations, rather 
than at one central point.  A distributed generation system often contains 
generating equipment, controls for fluctuations in loads, storage devices, 
and monitoring equipment.50  Distributed generation may either co-exist 
with and link to one of the three primary interconnections in this country,51 
loosely referred to in this Article as the “grid,” or exist off the grid.   
Microgrids organize distributed generation technology into a closed, 
low-voltage system that may address the needs of multiple users using 
multiple kinds of technologies.52  A microgrid might, for example, utilize 
two kinds of distributed generation—a fuel cell, stored underground, and a 
photovoltaic solar array, located on multiple existing roofs—and storage 
equipment to serve an entire block of homeowners.53  During the day, 
                                                                                                                          
47 See, e.g., Dinnell & Russ, supra note 24, at 538 (presenting these two options in the wind farm 
context as a “Hobson’s choice,” though the options really present a false dilemma, since there are more 
than two alternatives). 
48 The term “microgrid” or “micro-grid” appeared in just sixteen scholarly or professional articles 
in the Journal and Law Review database of Westlaw, searched by the author on Oct. 15, 2010.  This 
Article, however, is not the first to advocate for the use of microgrids.  See, e.g., Robert DeLay, Solar 
Power & NYC Schools: Good Government and Electric Sparkplug, 19 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 161, 
170 n.62, 171 n.76 (2009) (citing the suggestion from the Center for Sustainable Energy at Bronx 
Community College to make microgrids legal in New York state). 
49 See supra note 5.   
50 LASSETER ET AL., supra note 6, at 1–2.   
51 These interconnections are the Eastern Interconnection, the Western Interconnection, and the 
Texas Interconnection.  Within the Eastern and Western Interconnections, multiple regional 
transmissions organizations also play an important role.   
52 See supra note 6.   
53 Experts agree that while no technology is perfect (microturbines and fuel cells, for example, run 
on natural gas), such technologies are far cleaner than conventional combustion engines.  See, e.g., 
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when the sun shines, the neighbors might use the energy produced by the 
photovoltaic array, storing the energy produced by the fuel cell until 
nighttime.  Meanwhile, excess heat from the fuel cell might be channeled 
into a heat recovery system that heats water and/or spaces within the 
homes.   
Microgrids also present the opportunity for real-time management of 
aggregate production and loads.  A Dutch company has developed 
technologies that allow end users to manage microgrids through an 
accessible central control system.54  These products, which include an 
energy modem, software, and user interface, help end users (and managers) 
manage local energy networks.55  Homes could be connected to this 
monitoring system through individual meters, and neighbors could work 
out a tariff—that is, a schedule of rates determining the price of energy—
that reflects the cost of installing and maintaining the infrastructure.   
Like individual distributed generation facilities, microgrids could 
either tie to the grid or exist apart from it.  If interconnected with the grid, 
microgrids could connect as a “single self-controlled entity,” like any other 
end user.56  As day-to-day needs fluctuate, grid-connected microgrids 
could either draw power from the central grid or sell excess power to the 
local utility under applicable state net metering rules.  In systemic 
emergencies, the microgrid could be disconnected from the central grid 
altogether, both protecting energy needs of the users of the microgrid and 
protecting the central grid from unexpected electrical surges.   
Potential users of microgrids must review many variables to determine 
the best design of the microgrid from the outset.57  Flexibility to respond 
over time to changes in demand and other circumstances, however, is also 
important.  Ideally, a microgrid would function as a peer-to-peer system—
a system without a critical master controller essential to its operation.  It 
would also be a plug-and-play system—a system in which a new 
technology might be added at any point without undue disruption, like 
home appliances are placed in a home.58  With these two characteristics, 
                                                                                                                          
LASSETER ET AL., supra note 6, at preface, 1–3 (representing the premiere nationwide research group 
investigating alternative energy microgrids).   
54 Products, QURRENT: THE COMMUNITY ENERGY COMPANY, http://www.qurrent.com/eng/ 
products.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).   
55 Id.   
56 See LASSETER ET AL., supra note 6, at 1, 9–10 (describing the concept of the CERTS 
MicroGrid, which has such a feature and is now the standard model for microgrid connectivity). 
57 See, e.g., Hoff et al., supra note 6 (identifying six variables for determining microgrid 
characteristics: customer type, number of customers, types of distributed generation technologies, 
generation unit size, number of generation units, and level of system reliability).  Of course, the 
availability of favorable financing through incentives, rebates, loan programs, renewable energy 
credits, net metering, and other means would also dictate the scale of the project.   
58 See R.H. Lasseter, Microgrids and Distributed Generation, 133 J. ENERGY ENG’G 144, 146–47 
(2007) [hereinafter Lasseter, Distributed Generation] (explaining the peer-to-peer concept of 
micogrids). 
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microgrids can respond quickly and efficiently to user needs.   
Researchers across the country have ensured that the system described 
above, and variations thereof, is feasible from a technical standpoint.59  For 
at least a decade, the Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology 
Solutions (“CERTS”) has taken the lead on research on the optimization of 
microgrid performance.  CERTS includes four national research labs, nine 
universities, and eight industry groups,60 which aim to transform the 
electric grid into something more reliable, responsive, and transparent.61  
Research from CERTS participants and others has revealed that microgrids 
stand ready to be deployed. 
B.  Why Microgrids? 
With this understanding of microgrids, their prospective role in 
mitigating energy sprawl becomes clear.  Microgrids can provide energy in 
real time to small groups of end users from a location in and around 
existing development.  They are flexible and adaptable, and match the 
scale of demand, which for three-quarters of the users in this country is 
exceptionally small.62   
Microgrids present a compelling alternative to the current mode of 
generating power in the United States, which primarily occurs through a 
network of large-scale centralized facilities.  Microgrids reduce energy 
sprawl because they increase capacity without relying on massive, land-
intensive transmission lines that large-scale facilities need to transport 
power to customers.63  Nor do they usually require new parallel 
infrastructure for other utilities—such as water for solar panels, or natural 
gas for fuel cells and microturbines—because they are typically located in 
                                                                                                                          
59 See Publications, CONSORTIUM FOR ELEC. RELIABILITY TECH. SOLUTIONS, 
http://certs.lbl.gov/certs-pubs.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2010) (listing eighteen technical publications 
on microgrids alone); see also Hassan Nikkhajoei & Robert H. Lasseter, Distributed Generation 
Interface to the CERTS Microgrid, 24 I.E.E.E. TRANSACTIONS ON POWER DELIVERY 1598, 1598 
(2009) (articulating a framework by which the resources of a distributed generation system can be 
channeled into special kind of microgrid, the CERTS MicroGrid, which can be separated and 
reconnected from the central grid seamlessly). 
60 Research Performers, CONSORTIUM FOR ELEC. RELIABILITY TECH. SOLUTIONS, 
http://certs.lbl.gov/certs-org-rp.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2010) (listing Berkeley, Oak Ridge, Pacific 
Northwest, and Sandia among the national labs, as well as listing the universities and industry groups 
involved).   
61 See Vision, CONSORTIUM FOR ELECTRIC RELIABILITY TECH. SOLUTIONS, 
http://certs.lbl.gov/certs-vision.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2010) (expressing a fourfold vision, including 
the transformation of the electric grid into an intelligent network; the enhancement of reliability 
management through market mechanisms; the empowerment of customers to manage their energy use; 
and the seamless integration of distributed technologies).   
62 See AMORY B. LOVINS ET AL., SMALL IS PROFITABLE: THE HIDDEN ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF 
MAKING ELECTRICAL RESOURCES THE RIGHT SIZE 2 (2009) (noting that “[t]hree-fourths of U.S. 
residential and commercial customers use electricity at an average rate that does not exceed 1.5 and 12 
kilowatts respectively, whereas a single conventional power plant produces about a million kilowatts”).  
63 See RAWSON, supra note 5, at 6 (indicating the “value of reducing ‘foot-print’ or space needed 
by generation, transmission and distribution infrastructure” as a benefit of distributed generation).   
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areas already served by such utilities.  Such areas include central cities, 
which many argue could greatly benefit from a concentration of so-called 
“green jobs” related to the proliferation of renewable technology.64  If 
effectively deployed across the country, microgrids could reduce demand 
on the grid itself, which would reduce the need for additional transmission 
and distribution capacity, and thereby reduce the amount of land and 
habitat occupied or affected by energy infrastructure.   
Significant up-front outlays of capital for physical infrastructure are 
not the only expense of a large facility.  Currently, approximately one-third 
to one-half of consumers’ electric bills go toward the maintenance of 
existing large-scale infrastructure.65  In addition, sunk costs cannot be 
recovered if populations shift; our existing energy infrastructure is 
extremely difficult to move or modify.  Microgrids that incorporate plug-
and-play technology provide great flexibility for users, who can move 
equipment and modify systems as circumstances require.66  As Amory 
Lovins of the Rocky Mountain Institute has argued, while utilities have 
focused “on a few genuine economies of scale (the bigger, the less 
investment per kW),” they have “overlooked larger diseconomies of scale 
in the power stations, the grid, the way both are run, and the architecture of 
the entire system.”67    
Microgrids present an opportunity to re-configure these 
“diseconomies” of scale and make the country’s overall energy 
infrastructure more reliable and efficient.  Currently, electric power 
interruptions—including noise, distortions, high voltage spikes, and 
instable frequencies—cost industrial, commercial, and residential 
consumers eighty billion dollars annually.68  Disruptions to the grid can 
have a domino effect, with the Department of Energy warning of “a 
                                                                                                                          
64 See, e.g., Alice Kaswan, Greening the Grid and Climate Justice, 39 ENVTL. L. 1143, 1153 
(2009) (arguing persuasively that inner cities could benefit from “the integrated environmental and 
economic opportunities presented by new green-collar jobs”).   
65 THE SMART GRID, supra note 4, at 18.   
66 See supra text accompanying note 58. 
67 See LOVINS ET AL., supra note 62 (documenting two hundred benefits of distributed 
generation). 
68 KRISTINA HAMACHI LACOMMARE & JOSEPH H. ETO, ERNEST ORLANDO LAWRENCE BERKELEY 
NAT’L LAB., UNDERSTANDING THE COST OF POWER INTERRUPTIONS TO U.S. ELECTRICITY 
CONSUMERS xi (2004), available at http://certs.lbl.gov/pdf/55718.pdf; see also R. BRENT ALDERFER ET 
AL., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY DISTRIBUTED POWER PROGRAM, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., 
MAKING CONNECTIONS: CASE STUDIES OF INTERCONNECTION BARRIERS AND THEIR IMPACT ON 
DISTRIBUTED POWER PROJECTS 1 (2000), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy00osti/28053.pdf 
(arguing that distributed generation could improve reliability and save consumers billions of dollars 
annually); ROBERT GALVIN ET AL., PERFECT POWER: HOW THE MICROGRID REVOLUTION WILL 
UNLEASH CLEANER, GREENER, AND MORE ABUNDANT ENERGY 15–18 (2009) (describing the 
inefficiencies of the numerous regional power failures from 2006 to 2008); THE SMART GRID, supra 
note 4, at 8 (noting that the 2003 blackout in the northeast resulted in a six billion dollar economic loss, 
while a one-hour outage at the Chicago Board of Trade in 2002 resulted in twenty trillion dollars in 
delayed trades). 
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cascading series of failures that could bring our nation’s banking, 
communications, traffic, and security systems among others to a complete 
standstill.”69  Decentralization of power sources provides greater 
reliability, because if one power source goes down, other power sources 
can remain fully functional.70  For these reasons, decentralization via the 
microgrid could help address concerns of terrorist attacks on American 
energy infrastructure.  Decentralized microgrids can serve very remote 
sites, where development is necessary.  Finally, microgrids could help with 
transmission congestion issues prevalent in urban areas, particularly in the 
northeast, which in turn could drive down energy costs for consumers.   
Microgrids also provide a financially and operationally efficient 
alternative to individual distributed generation.  Studies have shown that 
microgrids can save users twenty to twenty-five percent in energy costs 
over the cost of individual distributed generation.71  Individual distributed 
generation can be very expensive for individual users and may be difficult 
to finance because of its small scale.72  Larger-scale microgrids, however, 
may be easier to finance and, as discussed elsewhere, spread risk and costs 
among multiple users.  
From an operational standpoint, with individual distributed generation, 
a single user must rely on a single technology to meet all energy needs.  
With microgrids, a variety of configurations and sources enables different 
energy needs to be met at different times by different equipment.73  Wind 
or solar power, which can be used when the weather conditions allow, 
could be combined with steady-stream energy generators, such as 
geothermal wells, to meet varying demands.74  In microgrids that serve 
multiple users, users’ different needs at different times of the day help to 
smooth out demand.  In other words, there are fewer spikes and troughs in 
use than in a system with one user; with fewer fluctuations in demand, the 
microgrid’s power can be more steadily utilized.   
Moreover, microgrids can use waste heat more efficiently than 
                                                                                                                          
69 THE SMART GRID, supra note 4, at 9. 
70 See Lasseter, Distributed Generation, supra note 58, at 146. 
71 King, Thesis, supra note 6, at 47 tbl.19 (analyzing system net present value savings from 
distributed generation and microgrids for hospital, office, mall, “urban mix,” and other users). 
72 But see Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 
Mar.–Apr. 2011) (describing the creation of energy financing districts in cities in California, Colorado, 
and New York, which use local government powers, such as tax overlay districts, to help private parties 
finance renewable energy). 
73 Lasseter, Distributed Generation, supra note 58, at 144 (“Indiscriminant application of 
individual distributed generators can cause as many problems as it may solve.  A better way to realize 
the emerging potential of distributed generation is to take a system approach which views generation 
and associated loads as a subsystem or a ‘microgrid.’”).  
74 Note that it may be especially important to ensure that fuel cells are paired with a technology 
that can help smooth demand.  Because fuel cells produce a steady stream of energy, they must be built 
to the peak capacity.  If connected to a grid, fuel cells feed electricity into the grid in off-peak hours 
and pull from the grid during peak hours.  Managing fuel cell input and output is an important 
consideration in microgrid situations. 
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individual distributed generation systems can, because one technology that 
produces waste heat can be combined with another technology that 
captures it.75  This phenomenon, called cogeneration or combined heat and 
power, improves dramatically on traditional, centralized systems, because 
the production of heat is closer to the point of use and because heat 
production can be better matched to heat demand.76  In traditional, 
centralized systems, half to three-quarters of such heat dissipates without 
being used, because energy production usually occurs very far away from 
end users.77  Using heat at the site of its creation can more than double the 
overall efficiencies of the microgrid,78 adding yet another benefit of 
microgrids over our current method of siting and utilizing energy 
infrastructure. 
Lower infrastructure costs, flexible configurations, and the ability to 
use waste heat result in big savings to microgrid users.  It may be 
important to conclude this section with some thoughts about the feasibility 
of small-scale energy sharing among neighbors.  Some may doubt the 
ability of neighbors to cooperate enough to conceive, execute, and 
maintain something as complicated as a microgrid.  Reviewing the 
American experience with district energy systems may assuage these 
doubts.  District energy systems are small-scale systems that offer 
institutions, groups of individuals, or certain economies of scale to heat 
and/or cool several buildings at once through a small- or mid-sized 
facility.79  Note that heating and cooling are not as regulated as electricity 
and other energy production.80  As one example of a successful district 
energy system, a condominium community in New Hampshire uses a 
central pellet boiler plant which uses locally produced biomass fuel for 
heat and hot water.81  The twenty-nine units range in size, and some are 
                                                                                                                          
75 See King, Thesis, supra note 6, at 3 (stating that “the development and adoption of 
interconnected micro-grids with combined heat-and-power applications” are the only way for 
microgrids to reach their full potential).   
76 See LASSETER ET AL., supra note 6, at 5. 
77 See id. at 4.   
78 See Robert H. Lasseter & Paolo Piagi, Microgrid: A Conceptual Solution, June 2004, available 
at http://certs.lbl.gov/pdf/mg-pesc04.pdf (stating that “[t]he size of emerging generation technologies 
permits generators to be placed optimally in relation to heat loads” and that the small scale of heat 
production “offers greater flexibility in matching to heat requirements”).   
79 Ideally, the users of district energy, like the users of future microgrids, have different energy 
needs that vary throughout the day, a circumstance that flattens demand.  An institution like a 
university, with different use profiles for different spaces, such as dormitories, laboratories, classrooms, 
auditoriums, and gyms, can take full advantage of a district energy system.   
80 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 757.005(1)(a)(E)–(F) (2009) (exempting from public utility 
regulation “[a]ny person furnishing heat, but not delivering electricity or natural gas to its customers” 
and entities “furnishing heat to a single thermal end user from an electric generating facility, plant or 
equipment that is physically interconnected with the single thermal end user”).   
81 Green Features, NUBANUSIT NEIGHBORHOOD & FARM, http://www.peterborough 
cohousing.org/green_features.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).   
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freestanding buildings.82  The central plant has helped the community to 
obtain the highest rank in the widely-recognized certification system 
administered by the U.S. Green Building Council.83  Concerns about the 
safety, utility, or effectiveness of district energy systems, which like 
microgrids serve multiple distinct physical spaces, have been greatly 
reduced as such systems have become more common.   
Moreover, various groups around the country are building networks 
that rely on the mutual support of neighbors to achieve alternative energy 
goals.  In the nation’s capitol, for example, several solar cooperatives have 
been established to share information, ideas, and labor.84  In Maryland, a 
chamber of commerce has worked with a local clean energy broker to 
negotiate bulk rates for the purchase of wind power.85  In New Hampshire, 
neighbors install alternative energy equipment for neighbors, in “energy 
rais[ing]” events not unlike the barn raising events of yesteryear.86  These 
efforts reveal a growing grassroots initiative among neighbors to mobilize 
for alternative energy.  The time to capitalize on this movement by 
facilitating the proliferation of microgrids is now.   
IV.  THWARTING MICROGRIDS, FACILITATING SPRAWL 
Despite their possible benefits, only a few microgrid projects have 
been attempted in this country, mostly as prototypes or demonstrations.87  
Many regulatory, political, and economic barriers hinder the creation of 
microgrids and thus facilitate energy sprawl.  Although an exhaustive 
treatment of these barriers goes beyond the scope of this Article, a brief 
survey reveals why the reforms described in Part V are so necessary.   
                                                                                                                          
82 Id. (describing the homes as having an energy efficient design). 
83 Id. (describing the platinum certification obtained through the LEED program). 
84 See, e.g., About, MOUNT PLEASANT SOLAR COOPERATIVE, http://www.mtpleasant 
solarcoop.org/about.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2010) (describing the network of seventy-plus 
households that negotiate bulk purchase discounts and exchange information);  Our Plans, COMMON 
CENTS SOLAR COOP., http://www.commoncentssolar.org/about.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2010) (citing 
its mission not only to educate potential solar users but also to make the cost of solar cheaper through 
collective bargaining); Solar Roof Project, CAPITOL HILL ENERGY COOPERATIVE, 
http://sites.google.com/site/capitolhillenergycoop/solarroofproject (last visited Oct. 26, 2010) 
(describing the process by which D.C. property owners can install solar panels on their homes and 
indicating that over one hundred individuals were participating in the information exchange). 
85 Rockville Chamber of Commerce Teams up with Clean Currents for First Ever Green Energy 
Buying Group, CLEAN CURRENTS, (Nov. 10, 2009), http://www.cleancurrents.com/index.php/ 
Rockville-Chamber-of-Commerce-Teams-up-with-Clean-Currents-for-First-Ever-Green-Energy-
Buying-Group (announcing the partnership which creates a green power buying group). 
86 The Plymouth Area Renewable Energy Initiative (“PAREI”), for example, has convened at 
least one hundred and fifty “energy rais[ing]” events to help individuals reduce the cost of solar 
installation.  See Sarah Schweitzer, Many Hands Make Light Work of Saving Energy; Neighbors 
Gather to Install Solar Power, BOS. GLOBE, May 8, 2008, at A1 (describing PAREI’s efforts on a 
house in Sandwich, New Hampshire); Energy Raisers, PLYMOUTH AREA RENEWABLE ENERGY 
INITIATIVE, http://www.plymouthenergy.org/about.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2010). 
87 See supra note 7.   
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A.  Regulatory Barriers 
By far the biggest barrier to the creation of microgrids is contradictory, 
unclear, or hostile law.  State legislatures and state public utility 
commissions have made it difficult to determine whether a microgrid 
project can be built.  One critical question is whether a microgrid should be 
considered a public utility.  State laws often define “public utility” to 
include any person or entity furnishing power to another, without regard to 
the number of recipients of such power and without exceptions for 
alternative energy or microgrids.88  Such broad definitions would subject 
even a microgrid with two users to burdensome regulation, because public 
utilities must abide by very strict rules that determine allowable 
technologies, tariffs, technical requirements, and other parameters.   
No state laws squarely address microgrids, and no comprehensive, 
publicly-available analysis of possible means to allow microgrids within 
current state law appears to exist.  Two studies, however, have shed some 
light on current law and regulators’ perceptions.  In 2002, researchers at 
Carnegie Mellon University interviewed utility regulators in eight states to 
determine how their states treated microgrids.89  They presented the 
regulators with several scenarios, including one in which a for-profit 
commercial firm served twenty customers in an industrial park, as well as a 
cooperative operated by its customers.90  Of the eight regulators, three 
indicated that microgrids in at least one presented scenario could be built, 
but only one of the three, the representative from Minnesota, indicated that 
small microgrids might be exempt from public utility classification and 
regulation.91  None of the other states had an exemption for small numbers 
of customers.92  Similar findings were obtained by a Carnegie Mellon Ph.D 
candidate in 2006.  He surveyed twenty-seven state public utility 
commissions, asking each whether a microgrid is legal.  Of those, 
seventeen said that the microgrid was “probably” or “definitely” legal, but 
                                                                                                                          
88 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 61-129 (2002) (defining “public utility” to mean “every common 
carrier, pipe line corporation, gas corporation, electrical corporation, telephone corporation, water 
corporation, and wharfinger”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66-104(a) (2002) (defining “public utility” to mean 
“every corporation, company, individual, association of persons, their trustees, lessees or receivers, that 
now or hereafter may own, control, operate or manage, except for private use, any equipment, plant or 
generating machinery, or any part thereof”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 704.020(2)(a) (2009) (defining “public 
utility” to include “[a]ny plant or equipment, or any part of a plant or equipment, within this State for 
the production, delivery or furnishing for or to other persons, including private or municipal 
corporations, heat, gas, coal slurry, light, power in any form”).   
89 M. Granger Morgan & Hisham Zerriffi, The Regulatory Environment for Small Independent 
Micro-Grid Companies, ELECTRICITY J., Nov. 2002, at 52, 53 (noting that some of the eight 
representatives were current regulators, and some were former regulators).   
90 Id. at 53–54.   
91 Id. at 53.   
92 Id. at 54.   
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only under very specific circumstances.93   
In addition to muddling the creation of microgrids, state laws also fail 
to specify how microgrids might be regulated.94  The 2002 survey 
mentioned above, for example, included questions related to 
interconnection with the central grids.  The answers reflected at best, 
confusion, and at worst, obstruction by utilities, public utility commissions, 
and state legislatures.95  The 2006 study showed that only four states of the 
twenty-seven surveyed had laws for individual distributed generation, 
tariffs, and interconnection procedures which could apply to microgrids.96  
While both studies are several years old and had small sample sizes, the 
findings reflect current concerns across jurisdictions.  More broadly, 
ambiguities in the law create fundamental uncertainties about the legality 
and treatment of microgrids, dampening investment even where microgrids 
might, with creative lawyering, be possible.97   
A few states have passed laws that could open the door for the creation 
and operation of microgrids.  Oregon, for example, defines “public utility” 
as an entity “that owns, operates, manages or controls all or a part of any 
plant or equipment in this state for the production, transmission, delivery 
or furnishing of heat, light, water or power, directly or indirectly to or for 
the public.”98  It excludes from public utility regulation any entity or person 
that provides heat, light, or power from: any energy resource to fewer than 
twenty residential customers; solar or wind resources to any number of 
customers; or biogas, waste heat or geothermal resources for nonelectric 
generation purposes to any number of customers.99  This definition implies 
that microgrids with fewer than twenty customers may be legal, although 
no legislation specifically provides for their implementation.  Across the 
country, meanwhile, Connecticut has authorized municipalities to create 
energy improvement districts that can own and operate distributed 
generation technologies and combined heat and power, have multiple 
customers, and charge customers fees for their energy use.100  The 
                                                                                                                          
93 See Douglas E. King, The Regulatory Environment for Interconnected Electric Power Micro-
Grids: Insights from State Regulatory Officials 1 (Dep’t of Eng’g and Pub. Policy, Carnegie Mellon 
Univ., Working Paper CEIC-05-08, 2008) [hereinafter King, Regulatory Environment], available at 
https://wpweb2.tepper.cmu.edu/ceic/pdfs/CEIC_05_08.pdf.   
94 See id. (“No states have clear guidance for the regulatory oversight of micro-grid systems once 
they are installed, and most respondents indicated that such oversight would be conducted on a case-
by-case basis.”).   
95 Morgan & Zerriffi, supra note 89, at 54 (stating that “[n]one of the eight respondents gave a 
simple yes” as to whether terms and conditions would be “clear and predictable”).   
96 See King, Regulatory Environment, supra note 93, at 1.   
97 Id. at 6.  
98 OR. REV. STAT. § 757.005(1)(a)(A) (2009). 
99 Id. § 757.005(1)(a)(C). 
100 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 32-80a(a)(1) (2009) (defining “energy improvement district 
distributed resources”); id. § 32-80a(c) (allowing an energy improvement district to, among other 
things, “[f]ix [and collect] fees, rates, rentals or other charges for the purpose of all energy 
improvement district distributed resources owned by the energy improvement district board” and 
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Connecticut statute provides that such districts are neither electric 
distribution companies—a kind of public utility in the state—nor 
municipal electric utilities.101  While the law on municipality-controlled 
energy improvement boards does not provide a similar capacity for private 
firms, it still represents a move in the right direction.  That said, without 
comprehensive statutes fully describing the treatment of microgrids, 
removing barriers created by legal uncertainties is very unlikely.   
B.  Political Barriers  
Any attempts to reform the law to facilitate microgrids will have to 
overcome objections from two politically active groups:  utility companies 
and neighbors.  This subsection outlines the impact of these groups on 
current laws and policies.   
1. Utility Companies 
Utility companies, which tend to object to distributed generation—and, 
by extension, microgrids—have a significant impact on state law and on 
the financial feasibility of distributed generation projects.  The utilities 
fight to protect their monopolies over service areas granted by the federal 
and state governments.102  The Department of Energy described this 
protective impulse and identified utility companies as major impediments 
to regulatory reform for distributed generation.103  Although utilities view 
any customer generation as potentially detrimental, their opposition to 
microgrids is far greater than their opposition to individual distributed 
generation, because microgrids involve exchanges of power and payment 
between multiple users.104  Such exchanges could infringe on the 
monopolies enjoyed by utility companies, and so are vigorously 
opposed.105  Microgrids may impose other costs on utilities, such as: an 
increase in the per-user share of capital costs for infrastructure 
maintenance; the need to provide standby power over normal capacity; 
                                                                                                                          
“[o]perate and maintain all energy improvement district distributed resources owned or leased by the 
board and use the revenues from such resources for the corporate purposes of the board”).   
101 Id. § 32-80a(d)(1)–(2).   
102 Only in rare instances are service areas open to competition.  See King, Regulatory 
Environment, supra note 93, at 6.  
103 ALDERFER ET AL., supra note 68, at iv (observing that “regulatory incentives drive the 
distribution utility to defend the monopoly against market entry by distributed power technologies” and 
that barriers faced by distributed generation “grow out of long-standing regulatory policies and 
incentives designed to support monopoly supply and average system costs for all ratepayers”).   
104 King, Thesis, supra note 6, at 3 (“Unlike conventional DER applications, micro-grids pose a 
perceived market threat to regulated electric utilities because electric power is exchanged from one 
customer to another within the micro-grid—a service that is currently restricted only to regulated 
utilities.”); see also id. at 83 (“Electric utilities have historically viewed customer-generators—those 
who have their own on-site generation—as financial, technical, and safety risks.”).   
105 See Morgan & Zerriffi, supra note 89, at 1, 5 (interviewing eight state public utility 
commissioners, all of whom indicated that utilities would oppose microgrid legislation vigorously).   
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system upgrades; the cost of safety and maintenance issues related to 
interconnection of the microgrids; and the cost of uncertainties in planning 
for infrastructure expansion or modification.106  If microgrids create too 
much uncertainty, a utility company may refrain from either entering into 
long term contracts for power or investing in long-term capital upgrades.  
Ultimately, utilities argue, these costs would be passed on to the consumer. 
One way utilities slow adoption of distributed generation laws is by 
raising false concerns about technical feasibility and safety.  For example, 
they often claim that distributed generation will supply power to the utility-
run central grid when the grid is down, causing fires or endangering 
workers who believe they are fixing de-energized lines.107  While these 
fears may have once been reasonable, technology to prevent this effect, 
known as “islanding,” exists and has been used successfully for over two 
decades.108  In addition, national safety standards, most prominently a 
standard issued by a well-respected international electrical engineering 
association, have been developed for the interconnection of distributed 
generation to the central grid.109  The majority of the states have begun to 
adopt model safety standards,110 although such adoption has not resulted in 
a clear legal framework for microgrids.  Utility companies have also 
argued that distributed generation equipment threatens power quality.111  
Here, too, new technologies have emerged that protect against negative 
effects on power quality.112  Other technological issues have been carefully 
analyzed and resolved by CERTS and other research and industry 
groups.113   
By raising unfounded concerns through public hearings, lobbying, and 
other activities, utility companies worry lawmakers already confused about 
the technical aspects of distributed generation.  This impact is particularly 
significant because utilities are often the most prominent group involved in 
drafting energy rules at the state level.  Nonprofits, individually affected 
parties, and manufacturers of distributed generation and microgrid 
                                                                                                                          
106 Douglas King & M. Granger Morgan, Guidance for Drafting State Legislation to Facilitate the 
Growth of Independent Electric Power Micro-Grids 2 (Carnegie Mellon Elec. Indus. Ctr., Working 
Paper CEIC-03-17, 2003), available at https://wpweb2.tepper.cmu.edu/ceic/pdfs/CEIC_03_17.pdf.   
107 See ALDERFER ET AL., supra note 68, at 9; VARNADO & SHEEHAN, supra note 8, at 29–30.   
108 ALDERFER ET AL., supra note 68, at 9; VARNADO & SHEEHAN, supra note 8, at 30–32.   
109 See, e.g., INST. OF ELEC. & ELECTRONICS ENG’RS, STANDARD 1547, IEEE STANDARD FOR 
INTERCONNECTING DISTRIBUTED RESOURCES WITH ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS (2003).   
110 See VARNADO & SHEEHAN, supra note 8, at 19 (indicating that thirty-one states had to date 
considered or adopted new interconnectivity safety standards).   
111 ALDERFER ET AL., supra note 68, at 10; VARNADO & SHEEHAN, supra note 8, at 32–34 
(“Power quality is important because electronic devices and appliances are designed to receive power 
within a designated range of voltage and frequency parameters, and deviations outside those ranges can 
cause appliance malfunction or damage.”). 
112 ALDERFER ET AL., supra note 68, at 10.   
113 See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text (reflecting research on voltage, generator 
configuration, monitoring equipment, and the like). 
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equipment have been active, but as the previous subsection reveals, they 
have not proven to be as well-organized, or as effective, in getting their 
initiatives passed into law.  
Beyond lawmaking, utilities have a profound impact on the financial 
feasibility of distributed generation.  This impact arises from utilities’ 
ability to set tariffs and policies on end users within their jurisdiction.  The 
Department of Energy has documented numerous examples of utilities 
charging unfair and outsized backup tariffs—supplemental, backup, and 
standby tariffs that distributed generators are required to pay to ensure 
access to the grid.114  Sometimes, the proposed tariffs have even exceeded 
the equivalent cost of the energy produced by the distributed generator.115  
In addition, utilities, which enjoy monopolies over buying back excess 
energy, have tended to offer very low buyback rates.116  Low buyback rates 
mean that power produced during off-peak periods which is not used by 
the microgrid cannot necessarily be fed back into the central grid, and sold 
back to the utility, at rates that would help offset the costs of investing in 
distributed generation.  Finally, utilities sometimes refuse to serve users of 
distributed generation, by refusing to connect them to the grid.  Backup 
generators that would alleviate worries of being without power—that is, 
protect microgrid users in a worst-case scenario—tend to add so many 
costs that entire projects are abandoned.  The negative impact of these 
practices on the financial feasibility of distributed generation, and by 
extension microgrids, is clear.  If past behavior is any indication, utility 
companies will continue to obstruct any reform that would facilitate 
microgrids.   
2.  Neighbors  
Neighbors, like utility companies, also have significant influence on 
the future of microgrids, although neighbors influence local law and policy 
more than state law and policy.  More specifically, neighbors have played 
and will play a big part in land use issues, which are traditionally local in 
nature.   
I have written elsewhere about localities’ role in siting alternative 
energy technology and will summarize my findings here.117  Of nearly 
forty thousand local governments nationwide, less than a hundred have 
squarely addressed renewable energy technologies like the ones that could 
                                                                                                                          
114 ALDERFER ET AL., supra note 68, at 21.   
115 Id. at 23 (describing a utility’s attempt to charge $144,000 annually for a backup tariff for a 
facility that would generate just $100,000 worth of electricity annually).   
116 Id. at 28 (“[M]ost current siting processes were designed for large power plants, thus posing 
barriers to distributed power analogous to those more fully discussed in this report.”).   
117 See Sara C. Bronin, The Quiet Revolution Revived: Sustainable Design, Land Use Regulation, 
and the States, 93 MINN. L. REV. 231, 235–40 (2008) (describing the locality of land use laws).   
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be deployed in a microgrid.118  Tens of thousands of localities have either 
barred or ignored such technologies, in the laws either as written or as 
applied.119  Local laws that thwart alternative energy projects include 
zoning ordinances, aesthetic controls, and historic preservation rules.120  
Examples of local groups using these laws to erect barriers to 
alternative energy equipment, particularly with respect to wind energy, 
abound.121  For instance, a city in Oklahoma changed its ordinances to 
prevent a wind farm from locating there,122 while a New York town 
enacted a moratorium on wind turbine towers.123  Even outside of formal 
legal actions, neighbors have managed to wrangle informal agreements and 
concessions from wind energy generators fearful of formal protests.124   
Wind turbines may be taller and bulkier than other alternative energy 
generating technologies, but each technology has physical features that 
may make its proximity undesirable to potential neighbors:  Solar 
collectors can be unsightly; microturbines can create a disconcerting hum; 
fuel cells are essentially large, trailer-sized boxes that are hardly beautiful; 
geothermal wells must be drilled fifteen hundred feet underground with 
loud equipment.  To be sure, technology is improving, and many old 
stereotypes no longer apply.  But in too many communities, neighbor 
involvement in local decision-making processes can help to kill microgrid 
projects that the utilities, and unfavorable state laws, do not.  The 
equipment that supports microgrids has to go somewhere.  If too many 
                                                                                                                          
118 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION:  2002 
CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS v (2002), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/gc021x1.pdf 
(indicating that 38,967 general-purpose local governments exist nationwide); Bronin, supra note 117, at 
249–50 (indicating that seventy-five of these governments have squarely addressed green building but 
have not provided a separate figure for localities that have addressed alternative energy).  
119 See Bronin, supra note 117, at 250–55 (indicating how localities have barred or ignored green 
technologies).   
120 Id. 
121 See Patricia E. Salkin & Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Cooperative Federalism and Wind: A New 
Framework for Achieving Sustainability, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1049, 1068–71 (2009) (providing a 
detailed account of neighbor opposition to wind energy siting, and arguing that “local opposition to 
wind turbines, often labeled NIMBYism, is common” and that “[i]n fact, some communities have 
adopted moratoria on siting wind turbines after project developers expressed interest in the areas” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
122 ALDERFER ET AL., supra note 68, at 20 (noting that since the wind farm owner in question had 
been grandfathered in, the farm could be sited in the town despite zoning ordinances).   
123 A prospective wind farm developer sued the town—but lost.  See Ecogen, LLC v. Town of 
Italy, 438 F. Supp. 2d 149, 152 (W.D.N.Y. 2006).  The moratorium stated that  
the installation of wind turbine facilities in the Town of Italy may have an adverse 
affect [sic] upon the scenic and aesthetic attributes of the Town of Italy and a 
correspondingly detrimental influence upon residential and recreational uses as well 
as real estate values in the Town of Italy, unless properly controlled through zoning 
regulations.   
Id. at 153.   
124 See, e.g., Jim Carlton, Bay Area: Wind Turbines Leave Some in a Huff, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 
2010, at A13A (describing various tensions between property owners who install wind turbines and 
their neighbors, as well as informal arrangements among neighbors, such as a wind turbine owner’s 
agreeing not to operate his turbine on weekends when his neighbor gardens).   
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neighbors object and the equipment cannot be located in previously 
developed locations, where the infrastructure to support it already exists, 
then energy sprawl will continue to spread. 
As Parts II and III clarified, the need to facilitate alternative energy 
microgrids, and the distributed generation technologies that comprise them, 
is clear.  In those communities that explicitly bar alternative energy 
technologies, concerted efforts must be made to reverse course.  In those 
communities that ignore alternative energy technologies, ambiguities must 
be resolved through careful redrafting of local laws.  For a variety of 
reasons, however, localities are unlikely to move forward with major 
reforms.125  In this limited respect, given the extra-local nature of energy 
sprawl, states may have a role in encouraging localities to facilitate 
microgrids—without ignoring neighbor objections—through carefully 
written state enabling statutes.126   
C.  Economic Barriers  
Uncertainties about the price of surmounting formidable regulations 
and the unsubsidized, high costs per user can deter investment in 
distributed generation and microgrid projects.127  As noted above, utilities 
may set tariffs or engage in selective discount pricing.128  Utilities’ refusal 
to establish clear guidelines for microgrid users make basic budgeting, and 
predicting returns, extremely difficult.  In addition, the relative cost per 
user of microgrids to other alternative energy infrastructure is very high.  
Microgrid physical infrastructure does not cost as much per unit of energy 
as large-scale, centralized facilities, because microgrids do not require 
extensive transmission and distribution systems.129  The costs of 
microgrids, however, must be borne by a smaller number of users than the 
costs of central grid infrastructure.  This denominator problem comes into 
play when dealing with administrative costs, such as costs related to 
environmental permitting and review, which may be the same for few-user 
projects as for many-user projects.130  The per-user comparative costs look 
                                                                                                                          
125 See Bronin, supra note 117, at 249–50, 255–60 (describing how localities are unable to move 
forward with major reforms due to the unpopularity of mandates, minimal efforts to amend existing 
laws or create new laws, and the power of interest groups in preventing sustainable-design principles 
from being written into local laws).   
126 See id. at 266–72 (explaining how states can balance local autonomy and public policy goals 
of pursuing alternative energy).    
127 See THE CERTS MICROGRID CONCEPT, supra note 6, at 21 (observing that rapidly changing 
commodity prices may deter investment in microgrids and stating that “it appears that emerging 
restructured electricity markets will deliver volatile commodity electricity prices and an erratic 
investment program that results in unpredictable electricity supply reliability”). 
128 ALDERFER ET AL., supra note 68, at 18.   
129 Hoff et al., supra note 6, at 2.   
130 ALDERFER ET AL., supra note 68, at 18.  Note that some states are already beginning to reduce 
administrative costs for small-scale projects.  The New York Public Service Commission, for example, 
has decided that utility companies cannot require interconnection studies for facilities that produce 
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even worse in light of the lack of public subsidies for microgrids.131   
Public subsidies for both individual distributed generation and large 
alternative energy facilities, on the other hand, run into the billions.  
Massive subsidies from all levels of government support individual 
distributed generation with one end user.132  These subsidies—grants, tax 
credits, property tax exemptions, renewable energy credits, loan 
guarantees, and low-interest loans—help individuals offset the up-front 
and ongoing costs of installing and operating alternative energy 
technologies.133  These subsidies have encouraged many individuals to 
embrace single-source distributed generation, although the ability of the 
vast majority of Americans to spend the money needed to match the 
government subsidies is admittedly limited.  Moreover, the receipt of these 
subsidies is tied to the on-site consumption of all of the energy produced 
by the subsidized technology.  So individuals who share energy, like 
microgrid operators, become ineligible for the incentive programs that 
make alternative energy financially feasible.134  Across-the-board revisions 
to subsidy rules are certainly in order.   
Government support has also been directed toward projects with many 
hundreds or thousands of end users, such as the wind turbine farms in West 
Texas or the solar installations in the Mojave Desert —projects that, while 
better than traditional forms of energy generation, nonetheless create 
undesirable energy sprawl.  State and local governments justify efforts to 
attract such projects to their jurisdictions not only on environmental 
grounds, but also on economic development and job creation grounds.  The 
public utility lobby has also helped increase financial support for large-
                                                                                                                          
fewer than ten kilowatts.  See N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Opinion No. 99-13, Case No. 94-E-0952, In re 
Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service, app. B (Dec. 31, 1999).  The Texas Public 
Utility Commission, meanwhile, allows utilities to require an interconnection study for distributed 
generation facilities, but the utility cannot charge the generator if it does not export power to the utility 
system or if it is smaller than certain set criteria.  Tex. Pub. Util. Comm’n, § 25.211, Interconnection of 
Distributed Generation, Dec. 1, 1999, http://www.puc.state.tx.us/rules/subrules/electric/25.211/ 
25.211.pdf. 
131 But see Press Release, supra note 7 (announcing over ten million dollars in federal government 
investment in three projects that appear to be microgrids). 
132 Numerous governments, and states in particular, provide a wide variety of subsidies.  See, e.g., 
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.27(a) (West 2008) (“A person is entitled to an exemption from taxation of 
the amount of appraised value of his property that arises from the installation or construction of a solar 
or wind-powered energy device that is primarily for production and distribution of energy for on-site 
use.”).   
133 See Mona Hymel, The United States’ Experience with Energy-Based Tax Incentives:  The 
Evidence Supporting Tax Incentives for Renewable Energy, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 43, 43–44 (2006) 
(arguing that the United States should have tax incentives for alternative energy, just as it does for 
conventional energy).   
134 King, Thesis, supra note 6, at 2–3 (“In order to be cost-effective, continuous-use applications 
require the DER customer to be interconnected with the utility grid so that the customer can sell excess 
power to the utility and purchase power from the utility during peak periods or on-site system 
failures.”).   
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scale projects that they control and operate.135  As these projects are being 
built, however, costs are being shifted to ratepayers and the general public.  
For one thing, large projects create energy sprawl, which itself imposes 
hidden costs.  For another, more strain is placed on the existing grid.  
Experts suggest that modernizing the grid could cost up to one hundred 
billion dollars, a cost which will be borne by consumers—in other words, 
internalized by those given few options to opt out.136  It makes a lot of 
sense to dedicate some of that investment to the financial support of 
microgrids, which would result in reduced demand on the centralized grid 
and reduced transmission and distribution costs.   
Expanding public support would, of course, make microgrid projects 
more affordable to end users.  Perhaps more importantly, it would make 
microgrids more attractive to third party investors, who, along with the 
utility companies, are important players in large renewable energy projects.  
Such investors would be attracted to a microgrid project if the project 
received direct public support to offset costs, tax credits which could be 
sold to the investor at a discount, and/or renewable energy credits or 
energy efficiency certificates which are growing increasingly valuable.  A 
further articulation of public subsidies for microgrids would be in order, 
once the law sufficiently addresses their creation.  For the purposes of this 
Article, however, political and economic concerns may be treated only 
briefly.  Turning now to Part V, we return to the law, and three ideas for 
resolving some of the regulatory barriers described in Part IV.   
V.  THWARTING SPRAWL, FACILITATING MICROGRIDS  
Slowing the spread of energy sprawl could be achieved in many 
ways.137  The most effective option would be reducing consumption, which 
seems unlikely given Americans’ unending appetite for energy.138  Other 
                                                                                                                          
135 Kamenetz, supra note 29 (“Big utilities are pushing hard to do what they do best—getting the 
government to subsidize construction of multi-billion-dollar, far-flung, supersize solar and wind farms 
covering millions of acres, all connected via outside transmission lines.”).   
136 LACOMMARE & ETO, supra note 68, at xi–ii.   
137 The Nature Conservancy recommends four ways to reduce energy sprawl:  first, reducing the 
area impacted by new energy development (a recommendation that seems circular); second, 
encouraging end-use generation; third, making any cap and trade bills flexible enough to include offsets 
from carbon capture and storage; and fourth, engaging in site selection and planning efforts to mitigate 
impact.  MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 10, at 6.  The author of the report added in an interview that 
conservationists could advocate to maximize energy conservation and energy efficiency; build 
incentives for the use of abandoned or degraded land, rather than natural habitat; and site new energy 
projects away from sensitive species.  Palmquist, supra note 3. 
138 Some scholars, like Alice Kaswan, argue that U.S. policy must address consumption, and that 
“the public’s increasing recognition of the global peril posed by climate change could shift the political 
landscape and increase the political feasibility of consumption-reducing policies.”  Alice Kaswan, 
Climate Change, Consumption, and Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 253, 256 (2009).  Elsewhere, I have 
addressed measures, such as green building mandates, which would curb consumption but remain 
skeptical of the possibility of immediate, large-scale reductions.  Bronin, supra note 117, at 231.  
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extremes—banning new transmission lines or refusing to subsidize any 
large-scale extra-urban energy projects—are equally infeasible.  In this 
situation, modest reforms would work best.   
Accordingly, this Article suggests three modest, but potentially very 
effective, means of facilitating microgrids, focusing on the primary role the 
states play in energy regulation and land use.  First, Congress should 
require states to consider model standards for microgrid regulation.  
Second, states should provide guidance to local governments with respect 
to siting microgrid projects.  Third, states should develop and authorize 
legal institutions that would support microgrid projects, drawing from 
Professor Robert Ellickson’s proposal for block improvement 
districts.139  If implemented together, these proposals would support 
small-scale energy sharing collectives whose emergence could 
transform the American landscape.   
A.  Regulatory Reform: “Considering” Model Standards 
State legislatures and agencies must lead reforms for microgrid 
regulation.  State public utility commissions regulate seventy-five percent 
of electricity in this country,140 and they have more expertise with the 
creation and operation of distributed generation than other regulatory 
bodies, including the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(“FERC”).141  Although states’ treatment of microgrids to date has been 
anything but impressive, there is some hope that they would comply with 
federal rules to consider model standards.   
In fact, states recently complied with federal mandates to review two 
other aspects of distributed generation regulation: net metering and 
interconnection standards.  The Federal Energy Policy Act of 2005 
required state public utility commissions to consider a model 
interconnection standard, based on the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers Standard 1547,142 as well as to consider a model net-
metering standard by 2008.143   
                                                                                                                          
139 Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75 (1998).   
140 JOSEPH H. ETO & KRISTINA HAMACHI LACOMMARE, ERNEST ORLANDO LAWRENCE 
BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., TRACKING THE RELIABILITY OF THE U.S. ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM:  AN 
ASSESSMENT OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION REPORTED TO STATE PUBLIC UTILITY 
COMMISSIONS 3 (2008), available at http://certs.lbl.gov/pdf/lbnl1092e-puc-reliability-data.pdf.   
141 FERC does play a role in distributed generation projects.  It controls all wholesale electricity 
transactions, including distributed generation.  And in 2005, FERC adopted interconnection standards 
for transmission-level (not distribution-level) interconnections with public utilities (defined under the 
federal statute) for projects smaller than twenty megawatts.  Standardization of Small Generator 
Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, Order No. 2006, 70 Fed. Reg. 34,190 (June 13, 2005), 
111 F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs ¶ 61,220 (2005).   
142 The full name of the standard is the Standard for Interconnecting Distributed Resources with 
Electric Power Systems.  INST. OF ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONICS ENG’RS, supra note 109, at 1.  
143 16 U.S.C. § 2622(b)(3)(A)–(B) (2006).   
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Congress passed this law after it recognized the need for 
implementation of technical standards with at least some common 
elements across jurisdictions, to spur distributed generation.  Ten years 
ago, the Department of Energy blamed lags in the development of 
distributed generation on the lack of “a national consensus on technical 
standards for connecting equipment, necessary insurance, reasonable 
charges for activities related to connection, or agreement on appropriate 
charges or payments for distributed generation.”144  Also in 2000, the 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory called the “patchwork of rules and 
regulations which defeat the economies of mass production that are natural 
to these small modular technologies” the biggest barrier to distributed 
generation.145  Ideally, as the Department of Energy and National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory recognized, manufacturers of distributed 
generation technology need national standards, lest they have to 
manufacture fifty different technologies to accommodate state preferences.   
The Federal Energy Policy Act requirements appear to have succeeded 
in abating these concerns and prompting states to review, modify, and 
standardize their policies on interconnectivity and net metering.  The states 
based their reviews in part on third-party model rules, perhaps most 
notably those drafted by the Interstate Renewable Energy Council.146  The 
Interstate Renewable Energy Council is a nongovernmental, nonprofit 
organization that aims “to remove barriers to renewable energy use.”147  
Interestingly, the net metering model rules require that the distributed 
generation system must meet, and not exceed, the generator’s on-site 
demand, meaning that to take advantage of net metering, the generator 
must not serve neighbors; in other words, microgrids are banned.148  Other 
model rules on interconnection standards have also formed the foundation 
for states’ efforts.  These include California’s Rule 21 interconnection 
standard, adopted in 2000; FERC’s Small Generator Interconnection 
Procedures, issued via Order No. 2006 in 2005; and the Mid-Atlantic 
Demand Resource Initiative Procedures.149 
During the period of review provided by Congress, thirty-one states 
                                                                                                                          
144 ALDERFER ET AL., supra note 68, at 34.   
145 Id. at iv, 21–23. 
146 See INTERSTATE RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, MODEL INTERCONNECTION PROCEDURES 
(2009), available at http://irecusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/IREC-Interconnection-Procedures-
2010final.pdf; INTERSTATE RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, NET METERING MODEL RULES (2009) 
available at http://www.irecusa.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ConnectDocs/IREC_NM_Model_October_ 
2009-1.pdf.   
147 About IREC, INTERSTATE RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, http://irecusa.org/about-irec/ (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2010). 
148 INTERSTATE RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, NET METERING MODEL RULES, supra note 146, 
at 4 n.3. 
149 See VARNADO & SHEEHAN, supra note 8, at 20–21 (describing the history of each of these 
rules). 
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adopted or amended their interconnection standards.150  Forty-two states 
have adopted net metering standards that allow distributed generators to 
sell excess energy back to the grid.151  These rules vary among states, 
based on the types of technologies, system size, system capacity, timing of 
payments, and the ownership of renewable energy credits.152  But we are 
no doubt better off today than we would have been without the 
“consideration” requirement of the Federal Energy Policy Act.  Moreover, 
the variety reflects our federalist structure, as states have been allowed to 
experiment with different reforms.153  States can continue to experiment, 
without federal interference, provided that they have considered the larger 
context for their decisions.   
Finally, states (and public utilities) may be eager to consider 
microgrids once they understand how microgrids can help them meet their 
renewable portfolio standard goals.154  Renewable portfolio standards,155 
adopted by state legislatures, require public utilities to incorporate a certain 
percentage of alternative energy in their productive capacity, within a 
certain time period.  Not all states have adopted renewable portfolio 
standards, and those that do vary widely.  Seventeen out of thirty states 
with renewable portfolio standards have targets of twenty percent or more, 
with each state assuming different benchmark and target years.156  The 
most ambitious states are Hawaii and Maine, which have targeted forty 
percent of retail energy sales to come from renewables by 2030 and 2017, 
respectively.157  Sixteen states have specific provisions setting goals for 
solar or distributed generation, the definition of which varies by state,  in 
                                                                                                                          
150 See id. at 19 (noting, however, that it is hard to say that these changes necessarily resulted 
from the Federal Energy Policy Act and that “[a] number of these states may have simply recognized 
the value of distributed generation and would have set about to reform state policies regardless of 
encouragement from [the Act]”).   
151 Id. at 11. 
152 See INTERSTATE RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, “CONNECTING TO THE GRID” PROJECT, 
STATE INTERCONNECTION STANDARDS FOR DISTRIBUTED GENERATION (2010),  http://irecusa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/02/February_2010_IC_Table.doc (presenting a comparison of states’ rules on 
interconnection, including limits on system capacity, insurance requirements, eligible renewable 
technologies, applicable sectors, and more); INTERSTATE RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, 
“CONNECTING TO THE GRID” PROJECT, STATE AND UTILITY NET METERING RULES FOR DISTRIBUTED 
GENERATION (2010), http://irecusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/February_2010_NM_Table.doc 
(presenting a similar comparison).   
153 Kate Galbraith, Renewable Energy’s Odd Couple, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2009, at WK3 
(observing that states’ experimentation can be helpful and stating, “[i]n the absence of sustained federal 
action to support clean energy and fight climate change, Texas and California are serving as important 
policy laboratories”).  
154 See RAWSON, supra note 5, at 5. 
155 For a full discussion of renewable portfolio standards, see generally Lincoln L. Davies, Power 
Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1339 (2010), and related commentary 
in Connecticut Law Review, Volume 42, Issue 5. 
156 FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, RENEWABLE POWER & ENERGY EFFICIENCY 4 (2010), 
available at http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/othr-mkts/renew/2010/01-2010-othr-rnw-
archive.pdf.     
157 Id. at 3. 
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their renewable portfolio standard.158  Such variation reflects the different 
factors—energy policy, economic development, the environment—that 
states must consider in enacting reforms. 
This Article does not propose model rules that Congress should require 
the states to consider, because others, including CERTS researchers and 
the Carnegie Mellon researchers mentioned above, have already articulated 
potential model legal frameworks.159  Without delving too far into the 
details, I believe a model standard should have several components: (1) an 
articulation of the state policy promoting alternative energy; (2) a 
definition of the term “microgrid” based on the definition in this Article—a 
multi-user entity with one or more independent sources of electric power 
and generation;160 (3) a limit on the size of unregulated microgrids, with 
respect to number of participants and energy output, to prevent overly large 
projects from evading public utility status;161 (4) a description of an 
application and registration process which would be administered by the 
state public utility commissions; and (5) the articulation of certain rights 
for microgrid owners, such as the right to net meter, and certain 
prohibitions on utility behavior, such as prohibiting them from refusing to 
serve microgrid customers.162  In addition, key to any reform is a clear, fair 
system of tariffs for microgrid operators and end users.163  A bi-directional 
tariff that takes into account the needs and goals of the utility companies 
and the microgrid operators should be developed.164   
If an acceptable model standard for microgrids emerges, Congress 
should adopt a rule that requires states to consider it.  Federal legislation of 
this nature can both respect states’ autonomy and build on states’ expertise.  
More broadly, such legislation would reflect political trends that support 
                                                                                                                          
158 Id. at 7. 
159 See, e.g., King & Morgan, supra note 106, at 1 (stating that states should pass legislation 
which would allow “development of independent micro-grids”); King, Regulatory Environment, supra 
note 94, at 11–13 (recommending specific regulatory changes).   
160 See King & Morgan, supra note 106, at 2 (suggesting that state laws include such a definition 
for microgrids).   
161 A reasonable size limit for an unregulated microgrid could be forty megawatts, which, as 
others have argued, would accommodate several users with different loads.  See id. (noting that peak 
loads for residential homes are ten to thirty kilowatts, for shopping centers two to eight megawatts, and 
for office buildings six to twenty megawatts). 
162 Utilities have great flexibility in applying tariffs and can relatively easily refuse service or 
change rates for operators of distributed generation technology or microgrids.  King, Regulatory 
Environment, supra note 4, at 7. 
163 As another commentator has summarized, public utility tariffs are set (or should be set) with 
seven goals in mind:  attracting capital for the utility, encouraging efficient management practices, 
promoting socially optimal consumer choices (preventing over- or under-consumption), ensuring 
fairness to investors, providing a stable and predictable rate level, encouraging efficient management 
and use of customer-generated resources, and compensating customers for services rendered to the 
utility.  King, Thesis, supra note 6, at 87–88.   
164 See Morgan & Zerriffi, supra note 89, at 6 (suggesting such a tariff and indicating that the 
tariffs “would depend on the size of the micro-grids, their number, and the nature of the distribution 
utility’s system and loads”).   
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the creation of so-called “green jobs” and the move toward energy 
independence.   
B.  Siting Reform: Providing Guidance to Localities  
The suggestion that states become more involved in providing 
guidance to localities for siting microgrids may seem counterintuitive.  On 
one hand, microgrids consolidate both generation and distribution in a 
finite area, and their most significant impacts are local, which might 
suggest local control.  On the other hand, the development and 
standardization of renewable energy is a nationally important issue, which 
might suggest federal control.   
State control, however, is preferable to local control because local 
decision-makers may not understand, or may be inclined to ignore, the 
impact of their actions on areas outside their jurisdiction.  They may reject 
microgrid technologies, taking a “not-in-my-backyard” approach that 
drives distributed generation projects outward.165  Such rejections would 
act to increase, not decrease, energy sprawl.  Similarly, state control is 
preferable to federal control, because federal control of renewable energy 
siting must be reserved for issues with interstate implications.  Microgrids 
have no such implications, as they can operate on the scale of the block or 
neighborhood and do not require interstate transmission lines.   
To clear a hurdle for potential microgrid operators, state legislatures 
should consider laws that provide special treatment for siting microgrid 
projects.  State public utility laws, discussed in the previous subsection, 
may include provisions on siting, although not all states deal with siting.  
Only about thirty states have formal transmission line siting statutes; none 
of these directly address microgrids.166  Even where siting statutes exist, 
scholars have criticized state legislatures for failing to clarify their siting 
authority.167  Such criticism, however, focuses on problems related to the 
inability of states to coordinate interstate transmission lines that carry 
energy across state boundaries, not the intrastate distribution lines required 
by microgrids.   
Land use regulation, an area of law in which states provide the 
framework within which localities make decisions, should also be used to 
advance the microgrid agenda.168  At a minimum, state legislatures should 
modify their standard zoning enabling acts, which give localities power to 
                                                                                                                          
165 See supra text accompanying notes 119–24. 
166 Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power Transmission Line Siting Authority, 39 ENVTL. 
L.  1015, 1019 (2009). 
167 See, e.g., id. at 1024 (describing the inability of state siting rules to address interstate issues).   
168 See Bronin, supra note 117, at 249–55 (“[S]ome localities . . . fail to include any explicit 
reference to green technologies in their land use regulations.  Although undoubtedly less problematic 
than an outright ban, failure to contemplate green technologies can itself hinder their utilization.”). 
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create and administer land use laws, to say that zoning boards and local 
councils may not take any action that would unreasonably burden or halt 
microgrid projects, absent a compelling state interest in doing so.  A few 
states have passed such laws to facilitate the siting of individual solar 
collectors, on the theory that localities may not necessarily consider the 
states’ broader energy goals when making land use decisions.169  
Expanding this protection to microgrid projects more generally, while 
allowing localities to impose only reasonable restrictions on such projects, 
would be worthwhile.   
In addition, states could encourage local land use offices to develop 
fast-track permitting processes and special building codes for projects that 
utilize specific distributed generation technologies.  Here too, state 
regulation could be implemented in such a way that local autonomy is 
respected—for example, providing incentives for localities who revise 
their laws.  Finally, states could require localities to include microgrid 
siting as a mandatory element of their comprehensive plans.  Many states 
require localities to draft comprehensive plans that take into account 
considerations such as affordable housing or open space.  It would be 
entirely appropriate to ask them to take microgrids into consideration when 
devising land use plans for their communities.   
Localities may object to any intrusion by the state into their ability to 
site renewable energy projects.  As Professor David Barron has written, 
however, localities do not and cannot enjoy full legal autonomy; rather, the 
state both grants and limits their powers.170  In his article Reclaiming Home 
Rule, Barron persuasively argues for a break from the outdated notion that 
“home rule” requires complete local control.  Siting this theoretical 
argument in the real-world example of urban sprawl, he argues that 
existing state laws that limit and grant localities’ power facilitate sprawl.171  
Barron suggests that states could engage localities in the fight against 
sprawl by freeing localities to enact creative regulations, such as 
inclusionary zoning or antidiscrimination laws, changing annexation rules 
to favor city-suburb bargaining, and prohibiting localities from adopting 
exclusionary zoning measures.172  Reconfiguring local power in the way 
that Barron suggests could be very helpful in reducing energy sprawl, 
which like urban sprawl is an extra-local problem.   
                                                                                                                          
169 Id. at 270–72 (describing state laws in California and Connecticut which take this approach).   
170 David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2263, 2373–74 (2003) 
(“[Localities] may operate within a legal structure that seems committed to securing their right to home 
rule, but that same structure subjects them to a variety of legal limitations—some clear, others less so.  
What now passes for home rule, therefore, is not local legal autonomy.”).   
171 Id. at 2366 (stating that “current state constitutional grants of home rule initiative [do not] 
include matters of greater-than-local concern” and that current state laws lead to “isolation of 
individual localities”).   
172 Id. at 2264–65.   
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Just as localities might reject state involvement in microgrid siting, 
federal officials may view state involvement as unwarranted or infeasible.  
In their article Local Energy, Garrick Pursley and Hannah Wiseman 
address the issue of siting renewable energy.173  They advocate for “the 
federal government [to] first establish some . . . minimum standard—most 
likely a simple prohibition on regulations that impede renewables siting—
for fostering the adoption of distributed renewable energy technologies and 
allocate primary authority for implementation and regulation, with 
substantial discretion, to local governments.”174  They then argue that state 
control on localities regarding renewable siting be altogether preempted by 
the federal government.175  The authors contend that establishing a direct 
connection between federal and local governments is consistent with the 
theoretical underpinnings of federalism and, from a practical standpoint, 
can facilitate the spread of renewable energy more easily than action by 
states.176  Another pair of scholars writing about wind energy, Patricia 
Salkin and Ashira Ostrow, take a similar approach, arguing that Congress 
should preempt certain state and local rules and offer a federal wind siting 
policy that constrains the ability of localities to make individualized zoning 
decisions.177  These scholars’ views may stem from the opinion that state 
political obstacles might be difficult to overcome.  Eroding states’ power to 
regulate siting of small-scale energy installations via federal preemption 
could hinder the ability of states to address other aspects of this important 
problem.   
C.  New Legal Institutions 
Assuming that the first two reforms suggested by this Article are 
adopted by Congress and the states respectively, new legal institutions will 
be needed to facilitate the administration of microgrids.  This Article 
proposes that states authorize the creation of block-level energy districts 
(BEDs) based on the block-level improvement districts (BLIDs) imagined 
by Professor Robert Ellickson.178  Such districts are not currently 
authorized, at least explicitly, by any state.   
Ellickson argues that BLIDs—micro-institutions that property owners 
in existing neighborhoods can vote to create and administer—could bring 
order to the inner city.179  In his view, property owners should be able to 
organize into BLIDs that can levy assessments to pay for specific 
                                                                                                                          
173 See Pursley & Wiseman, supra note 72.   
174 Id. at 44.   
175 Id. (arguing that “in addition to a federal minimum standard, federal preemption of state power 
to interfere with local decisionmaking” is necessary).  
176 Id. at 43–48, 56–59. 
177 Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 121, at 1082–83.   
178 Ellickson, supra note 139, at 77–78.   
179 Id. 
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projects.180  BLIDs, like the residential community associations common in 
new subdivision developments, could provide certain goods and services to 
small groups of people with common interests.181  Such goods and services 
could include “maintaining sidewalk planters and tot-lots, removing litter 
and abandoned vehicles, conducting block-watch programs, and providing 
other highly localized benefits.”182  George Liebmann, who arguably began 
the discussion about formal block associations in the legal literature, 
believed that block-level districts could deal with matters ranging from day 
care to law enforcement to traffic regulation to elementary schools.183  
Others have considered their potential impact on environmental species 
protection184 and trespass and zoning enforcement.185   
Ellickson characterizes these and other BLID goods and services as 
local “public goods.”186  Public goods are available for consumption by 
anyone, and consumption of a public good by one person does not reduce 
the availability of that good to others.  Truly public goods may not exist 
anywhere but in the minds of economists; often roads, the air, and police 
forces are cited as closest to the theoretical ideal.  Ellickson’s “public 
goods” fall outside of the traditional definition of public goods because, 
while they have benefits to the general public—crime deterrence, say, or 
aesthetic improvements leading to higher property values—they are 
                                                                                                                          
180 Id. at 77.  Others have cited Ellickson’s ideas as an inspiration for their policy proposals.  See, 
e.g., ROBERT H. NELSON ET AL., MERCATUS CTR., GEORGE MASON UNIV., FROM BIDS TO RIDS: 
CREATING RESIDENTIAL IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS 2–3 (2008), http://mercatus.org/publication/bids-
rids-creating-residential-improvement-districts?id=16056 (“Reflecting the spirit of Ellickson’s earlier 
proposal, states and municipalities should now establish the legal authority for the creation of RIDs 
[Residential Improvement Districts] as well as BIDs.”).  Nelson has also advocated in From BIDs to 
RIDs and elsewhere for RIDs to draw from the example of business improvement districts, which exist 
in many cities across the United States.  See Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A 
Proposal to Replace Zoning with Private Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 867 & n.206 (1999) (citing Ellickson and focusing on the potential for block 
associations to regulate zoning).   
181 Ellickson, supra note 139, at 82.  Ellickson identifies differences between BLIDs and 
residential community associations, stating that BLIDs are imposed on previously subdivided property, 
meaning that some BLID participants may not have “opted in,” that BLIDs are more likely to include 
public properties within their boundaries, and that BLIDs are more heterogeneous.  Id.   
182 Id. at 83, 97–98 (footnote omitted).   
183 George W. Liebmann, Devolution of Power to Community and Block Associations, 25 URB. 
LAW. 335, 351–83 (1993) (discussing the potential uses of neighborhood government).  
184 See Erin Morrow, Note, The Environmental Front: Cultural Warfare in the West, 25 J. LAND 
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 183, 244–45 (2005) (noting that block improvement districts are often 
supported by landowners and “almost universally allocate voting power based on an economic stake 
calculation,” unlike “special nature districts,” a proposal for which formed the basis of the article).   
185 See, e.g., Peter M. Flanagan, Note, Trespass-Zoning: Ensuring Neighborhoods a Safer Future 
by Excluding Those with a Criminal Past, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 327, 337–39 (2003) (citing the 
work of Ellickson, Nelson, and Liebmann as forming the basis for the argument that “[b]y allowing the 
residents of these preexisting neighborhoods to exercise the right to exclude [via privatized 
neighborhood districts], the municipalities simultaneously enable their police to protect, and ultimately 
revitalize, those neighborhoods by enforcing the property rights of those residents through criminal 
trespass law”).   
186 Ellickson, supra note 139, at 78, 97–98.  
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primarily enacted to benefit private parties.  Moreover, one person’s 
consumption of certain potential BLID services, like the tot-lots, would 
necessarily exclude others.187  At least some potential BLID services, then, 
appear to function more like semicommonses—that is, resources that at 
different times may be both publicly shared and privately captured—than 
public goods.188  Indeed, like BLID services, microgrid-created renewable 
energy functions as a semicommons because the energy is publicly created 
and stored, and because renewable energy reduces the impact on the grid; 
it becomes private, however, once an individual reduces that energy to 
possession by consuming it.   
The nature of the property protected requires special rules.  
Accordingly, this proposal for BEDs differs from Ellickson’s proposal for 
BLIDs in two important respects.  First, if energy is the shared good, more 
like a semicommons than a public good, states have to pass more specific 
enabling legislation than what exists for general BLIDs.  Specific rules 
governing safety and interconnectivity will have to be articulated.  Rules 
relating to how energy might be stored, sold, or returned to the grid would 
draw from public utility law and property law.  Moreover, the rights of 
stakeholders and any constraints on their ability to enter into business 
arrangements with each other must be carefully conceived.  Second, BEDs 
should not be mandatory.  To reduce the problem of the free rider, 
Ellickson argues that all property owners within the BLID, whether they 
supported or opposed its initial creation, should be obligated to chip in.189  
Mandatory participation is inappropriate, however, in the microgrid 
context, where the sharing of energy occurs on both shared and private 
property and requires the installation of infrastructure on private 
property.190  Requiring individuals to install piping, distribution lines, or 
monitoring equipment on their property could result in takings claims, 
something that both governments and microgrid operators would want to 
avoid.   
                                                                                                                          
187 It may be important to note that because microgrids by definition require extensive monitoring, 
tragedy of the commons problems do not exist in a microgrid.  Individual users’ consumption of the 
property (energy) would be monitored by meters that would allocate costs of energy use among users.  
Norms among neighbors would prevent abuses other than over-use, such as failures to report technical 
problems with equipment or siphoning energy without paying.   
188 Henry Smith has done more to advance semicommons theory than any other scholar.  See, e.g., 
Henry E. Smith, Governing the Tele-Semicommons, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 289, 290–91 (2005) 
(analyzing the mandatory sharing regime created by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 as a 
semicommons); Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 50 
ARIZ. L. REV. 445, 446 (2008) (applying an “information-cost theory of property to water law”); Henry 
E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 
131–34 (2000) (discussing the history of semicommon property rights and their importance today).   
189 Ellickson, supra note 139, at 77 (“I propose authorizing the owners of a supermajority of 
property to compel dissenting property owners to join a BLID . . . .”). 
190 For further discussion of non-mandatory block improvement districts, see generally Liebmann, 
supra note 183.   
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The articulation of a model law for the creation of BEDs is beyond the 
scope of this Article.  It is clear, however, that specific legal institutions 
must be created to address the unique problems posed by the microgrid.  If 
enacted along with the other modest reforms proposed in this Part, it is 
possible that microgrids could begin to operate, with the full protection of 
the law, within the decade.   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Even alternative energy has costs.  Energy sprawl, an unintended and 
harmful consequence of large-scale alternative energy projects, should 
concern policymakers around the country.  As this Article has shown, 
microgrids provide decentralized, flexible energy infrastructure that can be 
easily deployed in places already touched by development.  They can meet 
growing demand for energy without the negative consequences of larger 
(or, for that matter, smaller) energy projects.  Congress should act quickly 
to require states to “consider” model microgrid standards, while the states 
should provide guidance to localities on siting microgrids and should allow 
private parties to enter into formal arrangements to share costs and risk.  
Removing some of the barriers to microgrid development, even in an 
incremental way, could radically transform future land use.   
 
 
 
